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Popular summary
A tax on pollution is one of the environmental economist’s standard policy recommenda-
tions for correcting polluting activities which cause unintended harm to people and the en-
vironment. In theory, at least, the economist would like to set the tax at the optimal level
at which the value of the damages from one more unit of pollution is equal to the cost of
reducing pollution by one unit. This is the so-called Pigouvian tax which would maximize
social well-being or welfare. The basic idea is that by putting the right price on pollution,
individuals and firms will have an incentive to make choices which are in line with what is
best for society as whole. Like most theories, the Pigouvian tax can work perfectly only if
some very specific assumptions hold true.
In practice, of course, the costs and especially the benefits of reducing pollution are never
fully known. Determining the benefits of reducing pollution requires first an understanding
of the complex biogeochemical processes of pollution, including where, how long, and in
which form the polluting compounds remain in the environment. Secondly, even when
we have a good idea of what happens with the substance after its release, there is still the
question of how to value the damages in terms of adverse effects on people’s health and
livelihoods, and damages to plant and animal life. Although economists have developed
methods for doing this sort of valuation, it remains a very challenging task. On the cost side,
policy makers usually cannot know very well what the polluters’ actual costs of reducing
pollution are. In addition, there is the issue of which sources of pollution can actually be
monitored and effectively regulated. When there are sources of pollution which cannot be
regulated, there is always the risk of so called “emission leakage” - in other words, that
introducing a pollution policy will simply push some of the polluting activities to relocate.
In the end, environmental policies are not the outcome of the maximization of any ab-
stract social welfare function. Instead, they are the result of a political process likely to be
governed by, on the one hand, how much pollution is acceptable considering impacts on
public health and ecosystems and, on the other, which polluters can be effectively regu-
lated and how much they can spend on reducing pollution without reducing employment
or economic growth. It is important to understand also what sort of incentives these policies
provide to the businesses and consumers who make decisions about polluting activities.
This thesis consists of four self-contained papers on environmental taxes designed to
deal with the monitoring and emission leakage problems that are often relevant to the ac-
tual implementation of environmental policies. It covers two main themes. Papers I and II
focus on greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture. Papers III and IV focus on diffusion of
environmental technology and analyze when businesses decide to adopt emission-reducing
technologies.
Starting with the first theme, an environmental tax in the form of a price on emissions
of carbon dioxide (CO2) is a solution to climate change. However, Sweden is one of few
countries with a high CO2 tax (approximately e110 or 1000 SEK per tonne of CO2). Due to
international competition and the risks of emission leakage, a large number of exceptions
and deductions from the Swedish CO2 tax have been granted to industry. Primarily, it is
Swedish households and the service sectors which are facing the full Swedish CO2 tax on
fuels and heating.
The different tax rates across industry sectors is a cause for concern and is related to the
main problem that most other countries are not pursuing a similar climate policy. Globally,
most CO2 emission sources still go unregulated. Under the Pigouvian theory, for the world
to reach an emission target at the lowest cost, the price of emitting CO2 would need to be
the same irrespective of where the emissions come from and which activity produces them,
so that reductions are made where they are the least costly. This ideal arrangement is not in
place even in one country and is definitely not in place on a global level. Furthermore, to
achieve the least costly solution to climate change, other greenhouse gases (GHGs), such as
nitrous oxide (N2O) and methane (CH4), would need to be taxed at an equivalent rate.
Papers I and II are concerned with the fact that current climate policies primarily cover
CO2 emissions from the energy and transportation sectors, even though the agricultural sec-
tor is responsible for 25-30% of global GHG emissions. In the EU, the great majority of
agricultural GHG emissions are in the form of nitrous oxide from fertilized agricultural soils
and methane from manure and digestion by ruminants (cows, sheep, goats). However, mon-
itoring emissions of nitrous oxide and methane from agriculture is much more difficult than
monitoring CO2 emissions from fossil fuel use in the energy and transportation sectors. To
accurately monitor methane from digestion, emissions from a significant sample of animals
at each farm would have to be measured regularly. An accurate monitoring of nitrous oxide
emissions would similarly require virtually continuous measurement for a great fraction of
the fields. Obviously, in these circumstances, an actual emission tax on methane and nitrous
oxide is not feasible since the emission sources cannot be monitored at reasonable cost.
One alternative to an emission tax, which avoids the monitoring problem and reduces the
risk of emission leakage, is to tax the consumption of the most emission-intensive agricul-
tural products. These are generally food products from livestock production and, in particu-
lar, ruminant meat, such as beef. Paper I analyzes a greenhouse gas tax on the consumption
of animal food products. It aims to answer the question of how much emissions could be re-
duced if there were a GHG tax in the EU on the consumption of meat and dairy products on
the same order of magnitude as the Swedish CO2 tax. By lowering demand for agricultural
land used for meat production, this tax could also contribute to further emission reductions
by expanding the opportunities for biofuel production. The paper, therefore, also explores
different scenarios for how much emissions could be reduced by promoting substitutes for
fossil fuels through an expansion in bioenergy production. The results suggest that the tax
could lower emissions from EU agriculture by 7% - primarily by reducing the demand for
ruminant meat and encouraging substitution to poultry and pig meat, which give rise to
much less GHG emissions in production. Emission reductions could be six times higher if
the agricultural land no longer used for animal food production were used instead to grow
bioenergy crops that substitute for coal in power generation.
An environmental tax on consumption can have the additional advantage of clearly sig-
naling to consumers which products are more environmentally friendly and thereby possi-
bly influencing what they choose to buy, not merely by increasing the price of the polluting
goods, but also by informing them. A disadvantage is that a consumption tax does not pro-
vide any incentives to producers to change their production practices in ways which reduce
the environmental impact.
Paper II considers another alternative to an emission tax which does encourage produc-
ers to change their practices: taxes on polluting inputs to production. Fertilizer is an example
of a polluting input to agricultural production. However, taxing fertilizer generally does not
target agricultural pollution very well. Take the example of a tax on nitrogen in fertilizers.
The problem is that one unit of reactive nitrogen contributes differently to nitrous oxide
emissions (as well as water pollution) depending on when, how and where it is used. Still,
with the intention of reducing water pollution, Sweden introduced a uniform tax on nitro-
gen in commercial fertilizer in 1989. This tax was removed in 2010, possibly to compensate
farmers for planned future increases in the CO2 tax for the agricultural sector; this is another
illustration of political concerns over polluters costs.
The research question this paper aims to answer is to what extent the Swedish nitrogen
tax helped to reduce nitrous oxide emissions from Swedish agriculture. The results suggest
a relatively modest impact of a 2% reduction of N2O emissions from Swedish agricultural
soils. Nevertheless, it appears that increases in N2O emissions resulting from the political
decision to remove the nitrogen tax can possibly fully offset the decreases in CO2 emissions
that can be expected from the future increase in the CO2 tax for the agricultural sector. This
paper also illustrates some of the challenges in constructing a model that gives a good repre-
sentation of emissions resulting from complex processes and at the same time can be linked
to a simple model of the economic driving forces.
In the second part of the thesis, the focus is shifted to pollution resulting from energy
production. The long-run impact of environmental policies is determined mainly by the in-
centives they provide for innovation and diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies.
To manage climate change over the long run, innovative technologies that can drastically re-
duce CO2 emissions will be required. However, the technologies that already exist can break
the path of increasing CO2 emissions and, in the next decades, reduce them to levels which
would make it possible to avert dangerous changes in the climate system. What is missing
are the policies which make broad-scale investments in these technologies profitable and
thus encourage their diffusion.
Paper III and IV analyze diffusion of emission-reducing technologies under one type of
emission tax which Swedish policy makers successfully introduced in the 1990s to overcome
the problems of political resistance from polluters and the risks of emission leakage. What
was introduced in 1992 was a refunded tax (or charge) on NOx∗ emissions from large com-
bustion plants. By refunding the tax revenues back to the regulated firms in proportion to
how much useful energy they produce, the producers as a group pay a zero net tax. The
plants that are dirtier than average pay a net tax on their energy production while the plants
that are cleaner than average receive a net subsidy. This refunding scheme made a high tax
more acceptable to the regulated firms and also avoids emission leakage to plants whose
emissions are too small and costly to monitor.
Paper III uses a theoretical model to compare a refunded emission tax to a non-refunded
∗NOx is a generic term for the nitrogen oxides NO and NO2 which contribute to acid rain, among other
things, and should not be confused with nitrous oxide (N2O), which contributes to global warming.
tax in terms of how they stimulate investments in emission-reducing technologies. It aims
to answer the question of whether the refunding of taxes would speed up diffusion vis-a
vis non-refunded taxes. The results suggest that refunding can speed up the diffusion of
emission-reducing technologies, but this depends on how competitive the market for the
firms’ output is. There is no general result on which type of emission tax will stimulate
faster technology diffusion.
Paper IV is an empirical study of which factors determine when the firms covered by the
Swedish NOx charge invest in environmental technologies. It aims to answer the question
of what drives diffusion of different emission-reducing technologies. The paper analyzes
investments in three types of technologies - first, technologies which reduce the formation of
NOx at combustion; second, end-of-pipe technologies which are add-on measures that curb
emissions after their formation; and lastly, technologies which improve energy efficiency.
The results indicate that a firm which pays a higher NOx charge, net of the refund, is more
likely to invest, but this is only true for end-of-pipe technologies. The combustion plants
also belong to different industrial sectors, and the results show that firms in some sectors
are more likely to invest than firms in other sectors. End-of-pipe NOx technologies and
technologies that improve energy efficiency are more likely to be adopted in the heat and
power and waste incineration sectors, which is possibly linked to less competition and more
public ownership in these sectors.
In sum, this thesis analyzes three environmental taxes designed to deal with the monitor-
ing and emission leakage problems often relevant to the implementation of environmental
policies. It assesses impacts of these taxes relevant to their evaluation and contributes to the
discussion about appropriate policies for reducing pollution from agriculture and energy
production.
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Paper I: Greenhouse gas taxes on animal food products - rationale, tax scheme and
climate mitigation effects
Agriculture is responsible for 25- 30% of global anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions but has thus far been largely exempted from climate policies. Because of high monitor-
ing costs and comparatively low technical potential for emission reductions in the agricul-
tural sector, output taxes on emission-intensive agricultural goods may be an efficient policy
instrument to deal with agricultural GHG emissions. In this study we assess the emission
mitigation potential of GHG weighted consumption taxes on animal food products in the
EU. We also estimate the decrease in agricultural land area through the related changes in
food production and the additional mitigation potential in devoting this land to bioenergy
production. Results indicate that agricultural emissions in the EU27 can be reduced by ap-
proximately 32 million tons of CO2-eq with a GHG weighted tax on animal food products
corresponding to e60 per ton CO2-eq. The effect of the tax is estimated to be six times higher
if lignocellulosic crops are grown on the land made available and used to substitute for coal
in power generation. Most of the effect of a GHG weighted tax on animal food can be cap-
tured by taxing the consumption of ruminant meat alone.
Paper II: The Swedish nitrogen tax and greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture
The Swedish tax on nitrogen in synthetic fertilizers was abolished in 2010, possibly to com-
pensate farmers for planned future increases in the CO2 tax for the agricultural sector. This
study estimates the effect of the nitrogen tax on agricultural emissions of nitrous oxide
(N2O), another greenhouse gas (GHG) that is more potent than CO2. Price elasticities of
nitrogen fertilizer use are estimated from county-level panel data and combined with the
standard GHG accounting approach for international reporting of N2O emissions, as well as
an alternative emission function suggested in the literature, to estimate the impact of the tax
on emissions. The results suggest that annual direct N2O emissions from agricultural soils in
Sweden would have been on average 160 tons higher without the tax. Results also indicate
that higher N2O emissions from the removal of the N tax has the potential to fully offset the
decreases in GHG emissions that can be expected from the future tax increase on CO2 from
agricultural diesel use.
Paper III: On refunding of emission taxes and technology diffusion
We analyze diffusion of an abatement technology under a standard emission tax compared
to an emission tax which is refunded in proportion to output market share. The results
indicate that refunding can speed up diffusion if firms do not strategically influence the size
of the refund. If they do, it is ambiguous whether diffusion is slower or faster than under
a non-refunded emission tax. Moreover, it is ambiguous whether refunding continues over
time to provide larger incentives for technological upgrading than a non-refunded emission
tax, since the effects of refunding dissipate as the overall industry becomes cleaner.
Paper IV: Diffusion of NOx abatement technologies in Sweden
This paper studies how different NOx abatement technologies have diffused under the Swedish
system of refunded emissions charges and analyzes the determinants of the time to adop-
tion. The policy, under which the charge revenues are refunded back to the regulated firms in
proportion to energy output, was explicitly designed to affect investment in NOx-reducing
technologies. The results indicate that paying a higher net NOx charge increases the likeli-
hood of adoption, but only for end-of-pipe post-combustion technologies. We also find some
indication that market power considerations in the heat and power industry reduce the in-
centives to abate emissions through investment in post-combustion technologies. Adoption
of post-combustion technologies and the efficiency improving technology of flue gas con-
densation is also more likely in the heat and power and waste incineration sectors, which is
possibly explained by a large degree of public ownership in these sectors.
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Abstract Agriculture is responsible for 25–30% of global anthropogenic greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions but has thus far been largely exempted from climate policies.
Because of high monitoring costs and comparatively low technical potential for
emission reductions in the agricultural sector, output taxes on emission-intensive
agricultural goods may be an efficient policy instrument to deal with agricultural
GHG emissions. In this study we assess the emission mitigation potential of GHG
weighted consumption taxes on animal food products in the EU. We also estimate
the decrease in agricultural land area through the related changes in food production
and the additional mitigation potential in devoting this land to bioenergy production.
Estimates are based on a model of food consumption and the related land use and
GHG emissions in the EU. Results indicate that agricultural emissions in the EU27
can be reduced by approximately 32 million tons of CO2-eq with a GHG weighted
tax on animal food products corresponding to C60 per ton CO2-eq. The effect of the
tax is estimated to be six times higher if lignocellulosic crops are grown on the land
made available and used to substitute for coal in power generation. Most of the effect
of a GHG weighted tax on animal food can be captured by taxing the consumption
of ruminant meat alone.
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Abstract
The Swedish tax on nitrogen in synthetic fertilizers was abolished in 2010, possibly to
compensate farmers for planned future increases in the CO2 tax for the agricultural sec-
tor. This study estimates the effect of the nitrogen tax on agricultural emissions of nitrous
oxide (N2O), another greenhouse gas (GHG) that is more potent than CO2. Price elastic-
ities of nitrogen fertilizer use are estimated from county-level panel data and combined
with the standard GHG accounting approach for international reporting of N2O emis-
sions, as well as an alternative emission function suggested in the literature, to estimate
the impact of the tax on emissions. The results suggest that annual direct N2O emissions
from agricultural soils in Sweden would have been on average 160 tons higher without
the tax. Results also indicate that higher N2O emissions from the removal of the N tax
has the potential to fully offset the decreases in GHG emissions that can be expected from
the future tax increase on CO2 from agricultural diesel use.
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1 Introduction
Agriculture is responsible for 25-30% of total global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and is
the largest contributor to emissions of nitrous oxide (N2O) and methane (Smith et al., 2007;
Houghton, 1999; Steinfield et al., 2006). In Europe, most countries do not have agricultural
policies designed to reduce GHG emissions. Emission reductions in the agricultural sector
have instead mostly occurred through non-climate policies (Smith et al., 2007), such as agri-
environmental schemes which have helped to increase soil carbon stocks (Freibauer et al.,
2004). Another non-climate policy is the tax on nitrogen (N) in synthetic fertilizers which
was introduced in Sweden in 1984with the purpose of reducingwater pollution. Because the
use of nitrogenous fertilizers is also a driver of emissions of N2O, a very potent greenhouse
gas, the N tax may also have had an impact on GHG emissions. Nevertheless, in 2010, the
Swedish tax of 1.80 SEK kg-1 N was abolished, possibly to compensate farmers for planned
future increases in the CO2 tax for the agricultural sector1.
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the effect of the Swedish nitrogen tax on di-
rect N2O emissions from agricultural soils. Few previous studies have analyzed the link
between taxes on nitrogenous fertilizers and N2O emissions2. Many analyses which discuss
fertilizer taxes, such as Shortle et al. (1998), Shortle & Horan (2001) and Claassen & Horan
(2001), focus on impacts on water pollution. Fertilizer demand in general, on the other hand,
has been studied quite extensively. Previous studies of fertilizer demand in Sweden include
Bra¨nnlund & Gren (1999a), in which demand elasticities for six Swedish drainage basins
were found to be between -0.3 and -1.23. Bra¨nnlund & Gren (1999b) used the seemingly un-
related regression (SUR) estimator on a similar dataset and found that own-price elasticities
of nitrogen demand for seven different regions in Sweden were between -0.1 and -0.5 and
Ingelsson & Drake (1998) estimated a national own-price elasticity of -0.3.
Studying N2O emissions in particular is also relevant in view of the large uncertainties
1The tax rate is approximately 0.24 USD kg-1 using an exchange rate of 7 SEK USD-1. The tax was initially
a charge and from 1994 onwards 1.80 SEK kg-1 N (on average 20% of the nitrogen price) and later designated
a tax (SOU, 2003:9). The government’s stated intention with the proposal to abolish the N tax in 2010 was to
improve the competitiveness of Swedish farmers (Proposition 2009/10:41, p. 136). From reading the bill, a
natural interpretation is also that abolishing the N tax was intended to compensate farmers for, in the same bill,
reducing the previously generous deductions on the CO2 tax on diesel use in agriculture.
2Cara et al. (2005) assesses the potential GHG abatement at a range of CO2-equivalent prices using a linear
programming model for EU agriculture and could be said to implicitly analyze N taxes since they, like this
study, use linear relationships between N2O emissions and N use based on the IPCC methodology. Results are,
however, difficult to compare due to the differences in the level of aggregation and modelling approach.
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surrounding their relationship to nitrogen use. N2O emissions display large spatial and
temporal variability, and much uncertainty remains around the impact of nitrogen applica-
tion to soils (Grant et al., 2006). The IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change)
method for international reporting of N2O emissions under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) relies on linear relationships between emissions
and total nitrogen use, while studies such as Bouwman et al. (2002) and Van Groenigen et al.
(2010) suggest that N2O emissions may increase progressively with the rate of nitrogen ap-
plication. That the intensity of N use is a determinant of agricultural pollution is a natural
and almost implicit view in the literature on nitrogen pollution (see e.g., Galloway et al.
(2008) in Science). This study therefore also compares results based on the IPCC method for
international reporting of GHG emissions to results using an alternative emission function
suggested in the literature that takes the intensity of N use into account.
To analyze the impact of the N tax on N2O emissions, we first analyze farmers’ response
to changes in the price of nitrogen. We estimate price elasticities of total N demand as well
as price elasticities of N use disaggregated into changes on the intensive margin (N appli-
cation rates) and extensive margin (cropland allocation) from county-level panel data. We
combine the price elasticity of total N demand with the IPCC accounting method used in
the Swedish GHG inventory reports to find our first estimate of the impact of the N tax on
direct N2O emissions from agricultural soils. Second, we use an emission function for which
emissions is a function of the rate of N application. We combine this emission function with
the estimates of price elasticities of N application rates and cropland allocation to find a sec-
ond estimate of the impact of the N tax. To take account of the uncertainty surrounding the
value of the emission function parameters, we perform a Monte Carlo simulation of emis-
sions with and without the N tax. The mean estimate for the results based on the emission
function is comparable in magnitude to the estimate based on the IPCC accounting method.
The average estimated impact is a reduction in direct N2O emissions of 160 tons or 2% of
direct emissions from agricultural soils in Sweden.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the relationship between
agricultural N use and N2O emissions. Section 3 presents a simple framework for assessing
howdirect N2O emissions from soils change in response to a nitrogen tax. Section 4 describes
the data and econometric results on the price elasticities of nitrogen and land use. Section
5 presents the simulation results on the impact of the N tax on N2O emissions. Section 6
3
discusses the results and concludes.
2 Nitrogenous fertilizers and N2O emissions
Nitrous oxide (N2O) is a product of soil microbial processes and a natural component of the
Earth’s atmosphere. It is a potent greenhouse gas with a capacity to absorb infrared radiation
that is close to 300 times greater than that of carbon dioxide3. In the stratosphere, N2O also
contributes to the loss of ozone, with consequences for human health (Smith, 2010b). Since
1850, the atmospheric concentration of N2O has increased by 20%, indicating changes to the
sources and sinks of N2O in the global nitrogen cycle (Smith et al., 2010). The likely cause
is human activity and the major driver the application of nitrogenous fertilizers and animal
manure to agricultural land (Stehfest & Bouwman, 2006).
N2O from agricultural soils can be decomposed into background emissions as well as
direct and indirect emissions. Background emissions arise from unfertilized agricultural
fields. Direct emissions are the emissions from fertilized fields which are additional to the
background emissions. Lastly, indirect emissions occur when N2O eventually forms from
nitrogen lost from the farm system due to nitrate leaching or ammonia volatilization (Mosier
et al., 1998).
Direct emissions account for the largest share of N2O from agricultural soils in Sweden.
According to Sweden’s national GHG inventory report for 2009, submitted under the UN-
FCCC (SEPA, 2011), direct N2O emissions from agricultural soils were 7.8  103 tonnes in
2009, equivalent to 2.4 million tonnes of CO2-equivalents or 31% of the official Swedish fig-
ure on GHG emissions from agriculture. In comparison, indirect emissions were 3.4  103
tonnes of N2O and background emissions from the cultivation of mineral soils were 2.4  103
tonnes. In this study, we focus on the direct N2O emissions from agricultural soils.
The above figures for direct N2O emissions from agricultural soils are based on the IPCC
(2006) methodology recommended for countries’ reporting under the UNFCCC. They are, in
principle, assessed by multiplying a constant emission factor by total national additions of
nitrogen to soils, with different emission factors used for different sources such as synthetic
3The global warming potential (GWP) is a measure of the radiative forcing capacity of another greenhouse
gas relative to CO2 over a given time horizon. A recent estimate of the global warming potential of N2O for a 100
year horizon is 298 (Forster et al., 2007). In GHG national inventory reports submitted under the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), an older estimate of 310 is used for N2O, which means that 1 kg
of N2O is equivalent to 310 kg of CO2 in the GHG accounts (SEPA, 2011). For comparability with official GHG
accounts, we use a global warming potential of 310 for N2O in this study.
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and organic fertilizer nitrogen. The Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) uses
a factor of 0.8% for synthetic fertilizer nitrogen, implying that 1 tonne of nitrogen added
to soil is assumed to result in 80 kg of N2O-N4 released from the fields to the atmosphere.
Direct emissions, E, of N2O-N related to synthetic fertilizer nitrogen is thus approximately5
simply given by
E = cN2ON (1)
where the emission factor cN2O = 0.8% and N is the total amount of nitrogen sold nationally.
We use the relationship in (1) to find our first estimate of the impact of the N tax, and
refer to this as the emission factor approach. However, N2O emissions display large spatial
and temporal variability, and much uncertainty remains around the impact of nitrogen ap-
plication to soils (Grant et al., 2006). Indeed, the Swedish GHG inventory report for 2009 lists
direct soil emissions as the largest source of uncertainty (SEPA, 2011).
Some studies (e.g., Bouwman et al., 2002, Grant et al., 2006, and Van Groenigen et al.,
2010) suggest that N2O emissions may increase progressively with the rate of nitrogen ap-
plication. A potential explanation is that emissions of N2O increase as more nitrogen is
applied than is taken up by the crop, because nitrogen not taken up by the crop (residual
nitrogen) may be lost to the environment. Due to decreasing yield returns, residual nitro-
gen should be a convex function of the rate of nitrogen application. A convex relationship
between nitrogen runoff and nitrogen application is also a common assumption in the liter-
ature on non-point source pollution (Claassen & Horan, 2001). If the relationship between
emissions and N application is non-linear, the linear emission factor approach may give a
poor approximation of the impacts on emissions from changes in N application.
In a meta-analysis of studies of N2O emissions from agricultural soils in primarily tem-
perate climates, Van Groenigen et al. (2010) estimated yearly direct emissions per hectare as
a convex function of residual nitrogen. The proposed relationship was:
e(z) = k + y exp(rz), (2)
where e(z) is direct N2O emissions [kg N2O-N ha-1 year-1], z is residual nitrogen in kg N
per hectare and the estimated parameters k > 0,y > 0 and r > 0, are shown in Table 1.
4Since the relative atomic mass of nitrogen is 14 and the relative molecular mass of N2O is 44, 1 kg of N2O-N
is equivalent to 44/28  1.57 kg of N2O.
5In the official national inventory figures on direct N2O emissions from agricultural soils, some additional
smaller adjustments are made related to, inter alia, nitrogen lost as ammonia (SEPA, 2011).
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k + y represent average background emissions of 1.5 kg N2O-N ha-1 year-1 and r > 0 is a
scale parameter which determines the convexity of the function, i.e., at what rate emissions
increase with a marginal unit of residual nitrogen.
An association between N2O emissions and residual nitrogen may also explain observed
differences in emissions for different crop types, given comparable levels of nitrogen applica-
tion and other conditions. Bouwman et al. (2002) and Bouwman (1996) found that emissions
from grasslands appear to be lower than those from croplands. Grasses take up nitrogen
quickly and have a longer growing season than crops, which could lead to a higher uptake
of nitrogen and less denitrification in grasslands than for annual crops (Bouwman, 1996).
We take account of differences in crop nitrogen uptake by disaggregating cultivation
into three broad crop types: cereals, ley (here referring to fields sown with grass not used
for grazing) and other crops. Furthermore, we approximate crop nitrogen uptake by multi-
plying estimated crop yield with a constant share of nitrogen in crop yield, since there is a
strong linear relationship between total crop nitrogen and grain yield (Cassman et al. (2003)
in Bouwman et al. (2002)). The residual nitrogen can then be seen as a function of the N
application rate and the type of crop according to
z(rj) = rj   k j f j(rj), (3)
where rj is the N application rate for crop type j, k j is the share of nitrogen in crop yield and
f j(rj) is the yield function for crop type j .
Combining (2) and (3), we get emissions per hectare, e, with crop type j as a function of
the N application rate for crop type j, rj:
e(rj) = k + y exp(r(rj   k j f j(rj))). (4)
Figure 1 illustrates general relationships between the N application rate and crop N up-
take, residual nitrogen and the N2O emission rate for a concave yield function. Due to de-
creasing yield returns, marginal residual nitrogen is increasing in the rate of nitrogen appli-
cation. But whether an increase in residual nitrogen results in increased emissions of N2O
depends on the level of residual nitrogen. Up to levels of 50 kg N per hectare, there is practi-
cally no change in the level of N2O emissions according to the estimated relationship in (2),
which is also reflected in the example in Figure 1, since emissions only start to increase for
6
N application rates of more than 100 kg ha-1.
Using the emission function in (4), total emission can be approximated6 by
E =å
j
e(r¯j)Aj, (5)
where Aj is the number of hectares cultivated with crop type j and r¯j is the average appli-
cation rate for crop type j. We use the relationship in (5) to find our second estimate of the
impact of the N tax on N2O emissions, and refer to this as the emission function approach.
3 Estimating the impact of the N tax on N2O emissions
To estimate a counterfactual level of emissions using the emission factor, we need to know
the price responsiveness of aggregate nitrogen demand. Aggregate nitrogen demand N can
be seen as a function of the price of fertilizer nitrogen, h, availability of organic nitrogen
(from animal manure and urea), M, as well as other input prices, w, crop prices, p and total
area of land cultivated, A, i.e., we can write N(h,M,w, p, A). The price of fertilizer nitrogen
is in turn a function of the nitrogen tax, t, i.e., h(t). Using the linear function in (1), a
change in total emissions, dE, from a marginal change in the nitrogen tax, dt, can then be
approximated by
dE = cN2O
¶N
¶h
¶h
¶t
dt. (6)
Here, we employ a short run demand function and assume that the nitrogen tax only im-
pacts nitrogen demand directly through the price of nitrogen, given a fixed level of organic
nitrogen as well as total area of arable land. In the simulations, we will also assume that a
change in the nitrogen tax is fully transmitted to the buyers of fertilizer nitrogen, i.e., ¶h¶t = 1,
which is an assumption largely supported by a report from the Swedish Agency for Public
6On the basis of (2), total emissions would be more precisely estimated by E = A
R
e(z) f (z)dz 
åj Aj
R
e(rj)gj(rj)drj, with f (z) being the density function representing the distribution of N surplus rates across
all cropland A and gj(rj) the density function representing the distribution of N application rates for crop type j
across Aj. Owing to the convexity of the emissions function, the approximation made here of using the emission
rate for the average application rate will be an underestimate of the average emissions rate. Furthermore, as
pointed out by Van Groenigen et al. (2010), N2O emission variability remains large even after accounting for the
N application rate because of the wide variety of agroecosystems represented in their meta-analysis. Although
the majority of the studies included were conducted in temperate climates, additional factors such as weather,
crop residue quality, soil type and fertilizer type will also affect N2O emissions. Due to limitations in the data, we
cannot address this variation and the underlying assumption is that (2) approximates the average relationship
across the different agri-ecological conditions for crop production in Sweden.
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Management, see Statskontoret (2011:31).
In contrast, for finding counterfactual emissions for the non-linear relationship in (5), we
need to consider that nitrogen use may change in response to a changed nitrogen price both
on the intensive margin (changes in application rates) and on the extensive margin (changed
allocation of land across crop types). In particular, we think of the (average) nitrogen ap-
plication rate for crop type j, r¯j, as a function of the nitrogen price, availability of organic
nitrogen per unit area of agricultural land, m, other input prices and the price of crop type j,
pj, i.e., r¯j(h,m,w, pj). Similarly, the area of land allocated to crop type j, Aj, can be seen as
a function of the nitrogen price, availability of organic nitrogen, M, other input prices, crop
prices, and the total area of agricultural land, A, i.e., Aj(h,M,w,p, A).
To illustrate the intensive versus extensive margin effects, we can use the fact that the
change in total emissions, dE, as expressed in (5) is, to a first order approximation, given by
dE =å
j
h¶e(r¯j)
¶r¯j
¶r¯j
¶h
¶h
¶t
Aj + e(r¯j)
¶Aj
¶h
¶h
¶t
i
dt (7)
where Aj is the number of hectares cultivated with crop type j and r¯j is the average applica-
tion rate for crop type j.
Expression (7) illustrates the two price effects: the first on the intensive margin and the
second on the extensive margin. The intensive margin effect comes from the effect of the
tax-induced change in the price of N fertilizers on nitrogen application rates. The effect on
the extensive margin comes from the potential effect of the N tax on the relative profitability
of different crop types and the related changes in the allocation of land between crops. The
separation requires an assumption of constant returns to scale with respect to land, which
is in line with previous literature on non-point source pollution (see Claasen and Horan,
2001)7. We will test this assumption in the following section.
7Additionally, this separation into an extensive and an intensive margin effect is based on an assumption
of input non-jointness, also used by Moore et al. (1994) in modeling water use in irrigated agriculture. Input
non-jointness would here imply that nitrogen application rates are determined separately for cereals, ley and
other crops. More details on deriving nitrogen use and land allocation functions based on these assumptions are
provided in Appendix A.
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4 Econometric analysis
4.1 Data
We use panel data on nitrogen sales and nitrogen use for the 21 counties of Sweden over
the period 1989-2009. The data record annual sales of fertilizer nitrogen in each county. The
average nitrogen application rate for the three crop categories (cereals, ley and other crops)
is also available for every second year of cultivation. The application rates are the total of
the nitrogen in synthetic fertilizer plus estimated mineralized nitrogen from applied manure
and urea. The nitrogen data are aggregated over the crop seasons from June in one year to
May the following year. For each year in the same period, we also have data on the acreage
cultivated with cereals, ley and other crops.
For the main independent variable of interest, we use the real price of ammonium nitrate
per kilo of nitrogen as a proxy for the nitrogen price. As proxies for variation in the prices
of cereals, ley and other crops, we use real price indices for cereals, cattle and crops, respec-
tively. Prices refer to calendar years, meaning that prices lag four months behind the crop
season data on nitrogen use. Other input prices in the form of labor costs are approximated
by the real wage for unskilled labor in agriculture. The additional control of organic nitro-
gen availability in each county was estimated from data on animal numbers. Descriptive
statistics for all variables are presented in Table 2.
4.2 Econometric models and results
To find the price responsiveness of aggregate nitrogen demand to the nitrogen price, we
estimated the following econometric model for the time period 1989-2009:
ln Nit = g0 + gh ln ht + gMln Mit + gwln wt + g0p ln pt + gAln Ait + gtimetime+ ni + # it,
where Nit is sales of synthetic fertilizer nitrogen in county i in year t, ht is the nitrogen price
inclusive of the N tax in year t, Mit is the amount of organic nitrogen and Ait is the area of
arable land in county i in year t, wt is the farm labour wage and pt is a vector of crop price
indices in year t, time is a linear time trend and ni is a county fixed effect. Because all variables
are log-transformed, the coefficients are directly interpretable as elasticities. Models were
estimated with fixed effects8 to capture the effects of time-invariant agricultural conditions
8Because the regular Hausman test for comparing fixed and random effects is invalid in the presence of cross-
sectional dependence (Hoechle, 2007), we chose to use the fixed effects estimator, which is less restrictive and
9
that differ between counties and may affect nitrogen use.
Results are in Table 3. The estimate of the own-price elasticity of aggregate N sales is -0.27
and statistically significant at the 10%-level. The standard errors are adjusted to control for
heteroscedasticity and cross-sectional and temporal dependence. This estimate is in linewith
elasticities from the previous study on aggregate Swedish nitrogen demand in Ingelsson &
Drake (1998).
We estimated the following econometric model explaining the nitrogen application rate
for each of the crop types9 for every second year between 1989 and 2009:
ln r¯j,it = b0 + bh ln ht + bmln mit + bwln wt + bpj ln pj,t + bAj ln Aj,it + btimetime+ uj,i + ej,it,
where r¯j,it is the average application rate of mineralized N and mit is the amount of organic
nitrogen per hectare in county i in year t, pj,t is the output price related to each crop type j in
year t, Aj,it is the acreage cultivated with crop type j in county i in year t and uj,i is the county
fixed effect for crop type j. The logarithmic functional form10 here is consistent in principle
with a Cobb-Douglas production function. However, because we are using county-level
data, we do not make any structural interpretation of our parameter estimates other than as
point elasticities for the particular price ranges in the data.
Results for the N application rate for cereals, ley and other crops are found in column (1),
(2) and (3), respectively, in Table 4. The elasticity with respect to the nitrogen price for cereals
is -0.17. The coefficient is not statistically significantly different from zero with standard
errors robust to autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity11. For ley, the estimate for the N price
elasticity is close to zero (-0.021) and also not statistically significant12. The estimate for the
N price elasticity for other crops is, in contrast, -0.45 and significant at the 10% level 13.
allows for correlation between the county effect and the regressors.
9For readability, we suppress in the following the subscript j for crop type on the parameters.
10The application rates, which are averages such that equal marginal effects in levels across counties of differ-
ent size could still be reasonable, were also tested and gave comparable results.
11We reject both the absence of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity as well as cross-county correlation. To
correct for cross-county correlation, we also estimated the model with Driscoll & Kraay (1998) standard errors.
The Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are, however, consistently smaller (potentially indicating unexpected nega-
tive cross-county correlation in the residuals), and we therefore present the more conservative robust standard
errors.
12We cannot reject the null hypotheses of no autocorrelation and no cross-county correlation but we can reject
the null hypotheses of no heteroscedasticity. We therefore present the results with standard errors robust to
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.
13Again, we cannot reject the null hypotheses of no autocorrelation and no cross-county correlation but we can
reject the null hypotheses of no heteroscedasticity and therefore present the results with standard errors robust
to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.
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To be consistent with our assumption of constant returns to scale with respect to land,
the coefficient on the area of land allocated to crop type j, bA, should not be significantly
different from zero. For all three crop categories, the coefficient of crop acreage is small
and not statistically significant, which indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of
constant returns to scale.
Similarly, to find the price responsiveness of the land allocation, we estimated the fol-
lowing econometric models for each of the crop types, cereals, ley and other crops for the
years 1989-2009:
ln Aj,it = a0 + ah ln ht 1 + aMln Mit + awln wt 1 + a0p ln pt 1 + aAln Ait + atimetime
+V j,i + mj,it
where V j,i is the county fixed effect for crop type j. Prices are lagged one period because
we assume that the land allocation decisions are taken early in the season with expectations
about prices based on price levels in the previous year.
The results on land allocation are presented in Table 5. A priori, we would not expect
the price of synthetic nitrogen to have a pronounced effect on the allocation of land to differ-
ent crops since synthetic fertilizer nitrogen is a relatively small share of variable production
costs for Swedish farmers. From column (1) in Table 5, we also see that the elasticity of
cereals acreage with respect to the lagged N price is practically zero (-0.046) and not statisti-
cally significant14, in line with this hypothesis. Similarly, in column (2) the estimate for the
elasticity of ley acreage with respect to the lagged N price is 0.054 and also not statistically
significant. The estimate in column (3) for the elasticity of the acreage planted with other
crops with respect to the lagged N price is, on the other hand, larger (0.97) and statistically
significant.
The land allocation models generally have coefficients of the expected signs for the re-
spective crop prices and an acceptable level of explanatory power. In contrast, themodels for
the nitrogen application rates generally have few variables that are statistically significant.
The coefficients on the nitrogen price for the application rates are negative, as expected, but
the lack of statistical significance is possibly due to the relatively small number of observa-
14For all three crop categories, we reject the absence of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity as well as cross-
county correlation and therefore present the Driscoll & Kraay (1998) standard errors that are heteroscedasticity
consistent and robust to very general forms of cross-sectional and temporal dependence (Hoechle, 2007).
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tions, since data on the dependent variable is only available for every second year.
5 Simulations on the impact of the N tax
In this section, we assess the impact of the nitrogen tax on N2O emissions during the past
decade using the parameter estimates presented in the previous sections. We present the
estimated difference in N2O emissions with andwithout the N tax for the years of cultivation
1998/99, 2000/01, 2002/03, 2004/05, 2006/07 and 2008/09. We present results based on the
emission factor for N2O used in the Swedish GHG inventory reports as well as the emission
function suggested by Van Groenigen et al. (2010).
For the emission function, residual nitrogen was estimated by using yield functions for
representative crops for cereals, ley and other crops, respectively, and a constant share of
nitrogen in yield. Owing to the uncertainties surrounding the parameter values for the emis-
sion function, we present the results based on the emission function as a range from aMonte
Carlo simulation. Distribution moments for the parameters in the emission function were
chosen with the help of an expert in soil N2O emissions. We also took account of the impreci-
sion with which the price elasticities for the N application rates and the land allocation were
estimated and used the point estimates and standard errors as measures of the mean and
standard deviation, respectively, for what we assume are normally distributed parameters.
Further details on the simulation model and the assumptions are described in Appendices B
and C.
5.1 Simulation results
The results on the difference in N2O emissions with and without the N tax are summarized
in Figure 2. The black line shows the difference in N2O emissions with and without the N
tax, estimated with the emission factor approach and a point estimate for the price elasticity
of N sales of -0.27. The average estimated difference over the six years is 160 tonnes of N2O
with lower estimates for more recent years, owing to the fact that the real value of the tax
has decreased over time. 160 tonnes of N2O is 2% of the mean estimate of annual total direct
N2O emissions from agricultural soils over the period and equivalent to 50  103 tonnes of
CO2-equivalents15.
15CO2-equivalents are calculated by multiplying by 310 - the GWP of N2O.
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The dotted lines show the results from the Monte Carlo simulation using the emissions
function. Mean estimates from the Monte Carlo simulation with the emissions function and
the estimates with the emission factor approach are of the same magnitude. Over the six
years, the average estimated mean difference in emissions is 160 tonnes of N2O.
However, we also see that the range of values for the estimated difference in emissions
is wide, with the 5th percentile being lower than 10 tonnes for all years, while the 95th
percentile is as high as 780 tonnes N2O for 2000/01. The main driver of the wide range is the
parameter r in the exponential in the emission function. This parameter is highly uncertain.
In discussion with an expert in soil N2O emissions, it was set to vary between 0 and 0.06
with a mode at the point estimate of 0.04. The range between the 5th and the 95th percentile
also varies significantly between years. One reason is the low price of synthetic nitrogen in
the early years, which results in a larger percentage change in the price without the tax. On
average, this implies larger changes in the estimate of residual nitrogen and hence larger
differences in emissions for earlier years.
6 Discussion and conclusions
The objective of this study was to assess the effect of the Swedish nitrogen tax on direct N2O
emissions from agricultural soils. The results suggest that, on average over the last decade,
annual direct N2O emissions from agricultural soils in Sweden would have been 160 tonnes
N2O or 50  103 tonnes of CO2-equivalents higher without the N tax. This is 2% of the mean
estimate of annual direct N2O emissions from agricultural soils over the analyzed period.
However, much uncertainty remains around the relationship between nitrogen fertiliza-
tion and soil N2O emissions. The Monte Carlo results indicate that the abolishment of the
nitrogen tax could potentially result in significant increases in N2O emissions if the relation-
ship is a convex one. The reason is that marginal increases in residual nitrogen could lead to
a more than proportional increase in N2O emissions. However, we see from the wide range
for the estimates of the policy impact that insignificant effects on N2O emissions are also
possible.
The small difference in the mean estimates of the tax impact using the emission factor
compared to the emission function approach is due to the low estimates of residual nitrogen
in Swedish agriculture. Swedish farmers are already using fertilizers quite efficiently and
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the nitrogen use efficiency16 has increased from an average of 55% in 1995 to 70% in 2009
(SCB, 2011). This may be partly due to the longstanding nitrogen tax and the information
and advisory services on efficient use of nitrogen and phosphorus, which the tax revenues
have helped to finance.
As mentioned in the introduction, when the Swedish government removed the N tax, it
also increased the CO2 tax in the agricultural sector17. A more stringent climate policy for
the agricultural sector may thereby have substituted for a non-climate policy that had the ef-
fect of reducing GHGs. This results in an ambiguous net effect on total GHG emissions from
Swedish agriculture. It is therefore interesting to assess the net effect on GHG emissions of
the Swedish policy shift from a nitrogen tax to an increased CO2 tax on diesel in agriculture.
According to our back-of-the-envelope calculations18, a CO2 tax increase in 2007 equivalent
to the planned change in the CO2 tax for the agricultural sector would have implied a re-
duction in CO2 emissions on the order of 30  103 tonnes of CO2. In comparison, the mean
estimate of the increase in N2O emission from removing the N tax in the cultivation year
2006/2007 is 170 tonnes of N2O or 52  103 tonnes of CO2-equivalents. It therefore appears
that the removal of the N tax has the potential to fully offset the CO2 emission reductions
that can be achieved with the planned increase in the CO2 tax for Swedish agriculture.
In practice, the removal of the N tax and the increase in the CO2 tax have relatively
small impacts on national GHG emissions19. However, both taxes are likely to provide other
environmental benefits - the N tax in the form of reduced water pollution and the tax on
diesel in the form of reduced emissions of particulate matter and NOx gases, inter alia. It
therefore seems unfortunate if, for political reasons, one of these environmental taxes was
removed to compensate for increasing another.
Still, a uniform tax on nitrogen is far from being the theoretically optimal policy for deal-
ing with agricultural pollution. This is because the contribution of a marginal unit of nitro-
gen to soil nitrogen surplus and subsequent pollution will vary by crop, but also by time
16Efficiency is measured as the amount of nitrogen in crop yield as a share of total nitrogen additions to soils.
17More specifically, the generous deductions on the CO2 tax on diesel for farmers are being reduced gradually
in three steps, to be completed by 2015 (Proposition, 2009/10:41).
18Following Hammar & Sjo¨stro¨m (2011), we use a long-run own price elasticity of -0.2 for diesel use in agri-
cultural machinery. In 2007, diesel use in Swedish agriculture amounted to 3  105 m3. We use the actual 2007
diesel use and price as baseline. For simplicity, we change the deduction on the CO2 tax from the actual 77 % to
0.90 SEK per liter (the planned nominal deduction in 2015), which may lead to an underestimate of the impact.
19Total national GHG emissions in 2009 were 59.8 million tonnes of CO2-equivalents, excluding land use
change and forestry activities. A total of 8.2 million tonnes of CO2-equivalents came from the agricultural sector
in the form of nitrous oxide as well as methane (SEPA, 2011).
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and location specific conditions that affect crop yield as well as nutrient runoff and denitrifi-
cation. However, in the long run, a nitrogen tax should provide benefits in terms of reduced
soil nitrogen surpluses and thereby both lower N2O emissions and less nitrogen runoff to
lakes and rivers, albeit at a cost of slightly reduced yields.
Globally, more than half of the fertilizer nitrogen is currently lost by denitrification,
volatilization as ammonia and leaching of nitrate. All of these pathways lead to either direct
or indirect emissions of N2O (Smith, 2010a). To reduce the contribution from agriculture to
climate change, eutrophication and other environmental problems related to excess nitrogen
loads, policy makers need to find ways to increase the efficiency of fertilizer use. Although
the direct impacts of the nitrogen tax are difficult to identify, Swedish farmers are using ni-
trogen more efficiently than before. The Swedish policy package, consisting of information
on efficient use of fertilizers and a tax that may have helped to raise awareness, may there-
fore still be an alternative to consider in other countries which face problems of excessive
fertilizer use and nutrient pollution.
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Figure 1: Crop N uptake, residual N and N2O emissions as functions of the nitrogen appli-
cation rate
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Figure 2: Simulation results on the difference in N2O emissions with and without the N tax.
Dotted lines show results from a Monte Carlo simulation with the emissions function. The
black line shows results estimated with the emission factor approach.
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Table 1: Emission function parameters
e(z) = k + y exp(rz)
k [kg N2O-N ha-1 year-1] 1.44
y [kg N2O-N ha-1 year-1] 0.08
r [hayear(kg N)-1] 0.04
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs
sales of fertilizer nitrogen [106 kg] 8.93 11.74 0.4 56.3 439
average N app rate, cereals [kg ha-1] 86.84 20.72 35 136 203
average N app rate, ley [kg ha-1] 99.14 19.93 54 149 200
average N app rate, other crops [kg ha-1] 81.66 23.07 40 137.71 178
cereals acreage [103 ha] 54.71 61.63 2.22 261.65 462
grass acreage [103 ha] 49.01 33.15 13.19 194.21 462
acreage with other crops [103 ha] 13.44 23.46 0.56 135.68 462
total arable land acreage [103 ha] 129.98 119.52 31.58 507.54 462
total organic N [106 kg] 8.91 8.74 1.97 39.58 441
organic N per hectare [kg ha-1] 71.16 30.41 27.26 138.96 441
price of nitrogen [SEK (kg N)-1, ref year 2010] 8.85 1.62 6.57 13.98 21
cereal real price index 156.14 41.77 108 266 21
cattle real price index 253.28 73.81 172.9 452.3 21
crops real price index 188.9 25.16 162 261 21
farm labour wage [SEK hour-1, ref year 2010] 108.71 11.85 91 128 21
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Table 3: Sales of nitrogen in synthetic fertilizers
(1)
Price of nitrogen -0.269**
(0.101)
Organic N -0.255
(0.217)
Price of labour 0.694
(0.616)
Cereal price index 0.417**
(0.174)
Cattle price index 0.0188
(0.134)
Crops price index -0.584**
(0.274)
Total arable land 1.488**
(0.373)
Time trend -0.0207*
(0.0102)
Constant -15.46**
(5.135)
Observations 439
R2 0.486
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05
All variables are log transformed.
Model estimated with county fixed effects and Driscoll-Kraay standard errors.
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Table 4: N application rates
(1) (2) (3)
Cereals Ley Other crops
Price of nitrogen -0.165 -0.0209 -0.446*
(0.107) (0.135) (0.214)
Organic N per hectare 0.124 -0.0399 -0.00306
(0.136) (0.163) (0.197)
Price of labour 2.163** -3.615** 3.490*
(0.677) (1.057) (1.771)
Cereal price index 0.121
(0.110)
Cattle price index 0.0219
(0.129)
Crops price index 0.149 1.266**
(0.275) (0.510)
Cereals acreage -0.0410
(0.100)
Ley acreage -0.266
(0.171)
Acreage-other crops 0.0155
(0.0341)
Time trend -0.0243** 0.0689** -0.0478
(0.00834) (0.0183) (0.0282)
Constant -3.292 22.38** -15.18*
(2.594) (4.984) (7.741)
Observations 203 200 178
R2 0.253 0.159 0.059
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05
All variables are log transformed.
Models estimated with county fixed effects with robust standard errors.
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Table 5: Land allocation
(1) (2) (3)
Cereals acreage Ley acreage Acreage -other crops
Price of nitrogen, t-1 -0.0457 0.0537 0.966**
(0.146) (0.0892) (0.344)
Organic N -0.204** 0.185** 0.321
(0.0643) (0.0620) (0.257)
Price of labour, t-1 0.416 -0.698** 2.952**
(0.443) (0.288) (1.069)
Cereals price index, t-1 0.237* 0.293** -0.361
(0.131) (0.0898) (0.348)
Cattle price index, t-1 -0.522** 0.372** -0.184
(0.0738) (0.0496) (0.309)
Crops price index, t-1 0.0709 -0.598** 0.117
(0.235) (0.103) (0.853)
Total arable land 0.919** 1.163** -0.228
(0.255) (0.190) (0.902)
Time trend -0.0347** 0.0376** -0.0747**
(0.00653) (0.00482) (0.0247)
Constant 1.447 -1.847 -6.045
(4.510) (3.030) (11.58)
Observations 420 420 420
R2 0.534 0.592 0.240
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05
All variables are log transformed.
Models estimated with county fixed effects and Driscoll-Kraay standard errors.
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Appendices
A Deriving nitrogen demand and land allocation functions
To derive functions for nitrogen use and land allocation at the farm level, we follow Moore
et al. (1994) in modeling the production decisions of a multi-output competitive farm. Moore
et al. (1994)’s assumption of input non-jointness makes it possible to define separable crop-
level profit functions.
Land and organic fertilizer nitrogen are assumed to be fixed inputs which are allocated
across crop types to maximize total short-run profits over all crops. At the beginning of each
crop season, farmers choose the levels of the variable inputs for each crop type to maximize
crop-level profits based on crop and input prices in the previous year and a given allocation
of land. Next, farmers allocate the land across the different crop types to maximize total
short-run profits over all crops. Later in the season, when the land allocation is fixed across
crops, the farmers can update their nitrogen input decision based on current prices.
With these assumptions, the crop-level profit functions can bewrittenPj(h,w, pj,Mj, Aj, ),
wherew is a vector of prices for inputs other than synthetic fertilizer nitrogen, pj is the price
of crop type j and Mj and Aj are the organic nitrogen and area of land allocated to crop j,
respectively.
The decision on land and organic nitrogen allocation can then be written
P(h,w,p,M, A) = maxfå
j
Pj(h,w, pj,Mj, Aj) :
J
å
j=1
Aj = Aj
J
å
j=1
Mj = Mg
The 2J first-order conditions take the forms  ¶Pj(h,w,pj,Mj,Aj)¶Aj = lA and 
¶Pj(h,w,pj,Mj,Aj)
¶Mj
=
lM where lA and lM are the shadow prices of land and organic fertilizer nitrogen respec-
tively. The system consisting of the first-order conditions and the land constraint implicitly
defines the optimal land allocation Aj (h,w,p,M, A) over all crops j as function of the prices,
the availability of organic nitrogen and the total acreage of arable land.
Short-run demand for synthetic fertilizer nitrogen for crop j follows from Hotelling’s
lemma applied to Pj(h,w, pj,Mj, Aj):
 ¶Pj(h,w, pj,Mj, Aj)
¶h
= Nj (h,w, pj,Mj, Aj) 8 j
The average nitrogen application rate for each crop j, r¯j, is then given by
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r¯j =
Nj (h,w, pj,Mj, Aj)
Aj
8 j
If the production function for each crop has constant returns to scale with respect to land,
then the optimal average application rate is only a function of the input and crop prices and
the organic nitrogen allocated to crop j, i.e., r¯j(h,w, pj,mj).
Because we use aggregate yearly county-level data to estimate the input demand func-
tions, we are assuming that the sign of the price elasticities which are consistent with profit-
maximizing behaviour at farm-level will also apply in the aggregate. Furthermore, we use
the average organic nitrogen application rate over all crops, i.e., m¯ instead of mj, because we
lack the necessary information on the distribution of organic nitrogen across different crops.
B Estimating emissions from land and N use in previous years
For each year of cultivation (1998/99, 2000/01, 2002/03, 2004/05, 2006/07 and 2008/09), we
used the country-specific emission factors used by the Swedish Environmental Protection
Agency in the national GHG inventory reports to find a first estimate for total direct N2O
emissions. The emission factors are 0.8% N2O-N of the synthetic N added to soil and 2.5%
N2O-N of added N from animal manure. The background emission factor for mineral soils
is 0.5 kg N2O-N per hectare per year (SEPA, 2011). For 2008/09, the estimate of total direct
emissions using these emissions factors is 8.0  103 tonnes N2O. The total estimate was found
bymultiplying total sales of synthetic nitrogen and our estimates of total additions of organic
N by their respective emission factors and adding these to the background emission factor
multiplied by the area of agricultural soils. In the official national inventory figures on direct
N2O emissions from agricultural soils, a number of additional adjustments are made related
to, inter alia, nitrogen lost as ammonia (SEPA, 2011).
For the same six years of cultivation, we also derived an estimate of residual nitrogen
to be used with the emission function. We used data on the average application rate for
each crop category and assumed functions for crop N uptake, in line with equation (3).
For ley and other crops, we used yield functions for representative crops20 of the form
20For ley, we chose a function for fourth round ley which produced yield estimates consistent with official
average yield data for ley in SCB (2009). The category of other crops is dominated in terms of acreage by oil
seed crops but also includes a significant share of sugar beet and potato. The choice of a representative crop is
not obvious, as the production function should reflect the average nitrogen uptake for such a broad category of
crops. We chose a less concave yield function representing spring rapeseed. The high value of the parameter
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f j(r) = aj + bjr+ cjr2 + djr3 from the Swedish Board of Agriculture (Jordbruksverket, 2011).
Parameter estimates for the average yield functions are found in Table 6, which also includes
the assumed shares of nitrogen in crop yields for ley and other crops taken from Claesson &
Steineck (1991). For cereals, we instead used a function that directly represents the relation-
ship between N fertilization and the nitrogen in spring barley grain yield21.
Based on the estimates of residual nitrogen for each crop type, we found an emission rate
per hectare for each crop type from the emission function in equation (2). This should be an
underestimate of the average emissions rate due to the convexity of the emission function.
Table 7 shows results from the calculations for the cultivation year 2008/09. The average
emission rate over all agricultural land is estimated as 1.6 kg N2O-N per hectare and the
estimate of total direct N2O emissions over all cultivated cropland is 8.1  103 tonnes N2O.
Our total estimates are in line with official emission figures using both the emission factor
and the emissions function approach. The official figure on direct N2O emissions from agri-
cultural soils was, for example, 7.8 103 tonnes N2O (SEPA, 2011) for 2009, compared with our
estimates for the cultivation year 2008/09 of 8.0  103 tonnes N2O with the emission factors
and 8.1  103 tonnes N2O with the emission function. The magnitude of our total estimates
therefore seems reasonable for both the emission factor and the emission function approach.
C Simulations - estimating emissions from counterfactual land and
N use
For our first estimate of the impact of the N tax on N2O emissions, the counterfactual na-
tional sales of nitrogen (i.e., the national sales without a tax on synthetic fertilizer nitrogen)
in year t without the N tax for each year was calculated according to
Nct = Nt
ht   t
ht
gˆh
.
Assuming that the use of nitrogen from animalmanure is completely inelastic to the price
of synthetic N, we estimated the difference in N2O emissions by multiplying the estimated
difference in synthetic N sales with the emission factor for synthetic fertilizer nitrogen of
indicating rapeseed yield at a zero level of N fertilization was reduced and calibrated to be consistent with our
own estimate of the average N uptake for the mix of crops included in the category of other crops.
21The function is taken from Johnsson et al. (2006) and is estimated for spring barley grown in southern Go¨ta-
land, and matches well our own estimates of the average N uptake for cereals.
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0.8% N2O-N.
For our second estimate of the impact of the N tax, we calculated the counterfactual ni-
trogen application rate for crop type j in year t, r¯cj,t, from the actual national average nitrogen
application rate in year t, r¯j,t, as
r¯cj,t = r¯j,t
ht   t
ht
bˆ j,h
.
Similarly, we calculated the counterfactual land allocations in year t, Acj,t, from the actual
national land allocations in year t, Aj,t, as
Acj,t = Aj,t
ht 1   t
ht 1
aˆj,h
.
Because of lack of data, we assumed that the area of land for grazing is inelastic to the
price of synthetic nitrogen. For the acreage of fallow and unfertilized land, we imposed a
correction for the interdependency in land allocation by matching a decrease in cultivated
acreage by an increase in unfertilized and fallow land of the same size and vice versa, such
that the total area of agricultural land is unchanged in the counterfactual.
For the Monte Carlo analysis, we checked the sensitivity of our main outcome variable
- the difference in N2O emissions with and without the N tax - to variations in individual
parameters. From this check, we chose to randomly vary the emission parameters y and r
and the N price elasticities of the N application rates and land allocations. We also randomly
varied the concavity parameters cj in the production function for the three different crop
categories because the value of this parameter is relatively uncertain and impacts the change
in crop N uptake in the counterfactual.
Distributional assumptions used in the Monte Carlo simulation are presented in Table 8.
We assumed that the price elasticities are normally distributed and used the point estimtes
and standard errors from the econometric results as estimates of the mean and standard
deviation, respectively. We truncated the maximum value of the price elasticities for the ap-
plication rates at 0 because a positive value counters economic intuition. The distribution
moments for the emission parameters y and r were chosen in discussion with an expert in
soil N2O emissions. For the concavity parameters, we assumed minimum and maximum
values, which generated estimates of crop nitrogen uptake in a range consistent with avail-
able data.
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Because parameter values are independently and randomly drawn for each run, the un-
derlying assumption behind our Monte Carlo analysis is that the parameters are indepen-
dently distributed. This is presumably not true, e.g., for the price elasticities, and should
be kept in mind when evaluating the results. Furthermore, there are, of course, additional
uncertainties regarding the structural model assumptions that are not accounted for in the
Monte Carlo analysis. However, the Monte Carlo simulation should still be a useful illustra-
tion of some of the uncertainty relevant to our analysis.
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Table 6: Assumed representative yield functions for cereals, ley and other crops.
Cereals Ley Other crops
representative crop spring barley, south 4th round ley spring rapeseed
a 46 2950 1600
b 0.535 25.4 19
c -0.0129 -0.021 -0.07
d 0 0 0.0001
k - share of N in yield 100% 2.5% 3.5%
Yield as a function of the N application rate in the form f j(r) = aj + bjr + cjr2 + djr3. The yield for
cereals is shown in terms of nitrogen in grain yield.
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Table 8: Assumed distributions of parameters for Monte Carlo simulation.
Parameter Distribution Mean St.dev Min Max Mode
y normal 0.08 0.03
r triangular 0 0.06 0.04
bw1 - cereals normal -0.165 0.107 0
bw1 - ley normal -0.021 0.135 0
bw1 - other crops normal -0.446 0.214 0
aw1 - cereals normal -0.046 0.146
aw1 - ley normal 0.054 0.089
aw1 - other crops normal 0.966 0.344
c - cereals triangular -0.01 0 -0.0013
c - ley triangular -0.1 0 - 0.021
c - other crops triangular -0.1 0 -0.052
c refers to the parameter in the relevant yield function of the form f j(r) = aj + bjr+ cjr2 + djr3.
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Abstract
We analyze diffusion of an abatement technology under a standard emission tax com-
pared to an emission tax which is refunded in proportion to output market share. The
results indicate that refunding can speed up diffusion if firms do not strategically in-
fluence the size of the refund. If they do, it is ambiguous whether diffusion is slower
or faster than under a non-refunded emission tax. Moreover, it is ambiguous whether
refunding continues over time to provide larger incentives for technological upgrading
than a non-refunded emission tax, since the effects of refunding dissipate as the overall
industry becomes cleaner.
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1 Introduction
From a welfare point of view, the optimal rate of adoption of environmentally friendly tech-
nologies should balance the investment costs against the benefits of adoption in terms of
reduced environmental damages and lower abatement costs. Nevertheless, the interplay
of technology and environmental market failures implies that markets often underinvest in
new technology. It is unlikely that environmental policy alone creates sufficient incentives
for technological change - strengthening the case for second-best policies.
In theory, a strong and stable price of emissions implemented through an emission tax
should induce both investment in R&D and a “cost-effective” allocation among firms of the
burden of achieving given levels of environmental protection. In reality, however, introduc-
ing such an emission tax may prove politically infeasible since regulated firms will often
argue that they will lose international competitiveness. As well as job losses if firms relocate
or close, an additional concern is the relocation of pollution, or so-called emission leakage in
the case of transboundary pollution such as greenhouse gas emissions.
One potential way of making emission taxes more politically feasible is to refund the tax
revenues to the regulated industry (Hagem et al., 2012; Aidt, 2010; Fredriksson & Sterner,
2005). One method for such refunding is to refund the revenues in proportion to the output
market share. This is the approach that Swedish policy makers used in 1992 when intro-
ducing a charge on NOx emissions from large combustion plants. The policy was explicitly
intended to affect technology adoption. The refunding scheme enabled the introduction
of an emission charge sufficiently high to induce abatement (Sterner & Ho¨glund-Isaksson,
2006). This tax and refunding scheme, sometimes referred to as refunded emission payment
(REP), has been extensively studied in the theoretical literature concerning the incentives for
emission abatement and production and how it compares to optimal policy; see e.g., Fischer
(2011), Cato (2010), Montero (2008), Sterner & Ho¨glund-Isaksson (2006) and Gersbach & Re-
quate (2004)1. From the empirical side, Sterner & Turnheim (2009) study the effects of the
1Gersbach & Requate (2004) and Sterner & Ho¨glund-Isaksson (2006) analyze the incentives for abatement
and production provided by an output based refunding scheme in markets characterized by imperfect and
perfect competition, respectively. Cato (2010) studies the effects of refunding on market structure, showing
that a refunding system might have to be complemented with an entry license to ensure that the system does
not encourage too much market entry. Fischer (2011) studies the performance of refunding schemes when firms
can strategically influence the size of the refund; since firms know that part of any emissions rents they create
will be returned to them, refunding discourages large firms from abating emissions and subsidizes high emitters
to a greater extent. Notably, Montero (2008) studies the use of refunds for inducing firms to reveal their private
valuation of common pool resources. He propose a mechanism that builds upon a conventional uniform-price
2
Swedish refunded charge onNOx emissions. Their results indicate that the charge had a very
substantial role in explaining the sharp decrease in NOx emission intensities; not only did
the best plants make rapid progress in emission reductions, but there was also considerable
catching up, such that today the majority of plants have lowered their emission intensities
much more relative to the cleanest plants.
In this paper, we model the pattern of adoption of environmentally friendly technologies
under a ”standard” emission tax (hereinafter, emission tax) and an emission tax for which
the revenues are returned to the aggregate of taxed firms in proportion to output (hereinafter,
refunded tax). We consider the case of exogenous refunding, where firms take the size of the
refund as given, vis-a-vis endogenous refunding, where firms recognize that a share of their
emissions tax payments will be returned to them2. To the best of our knowledge, despite
a growing body of literature analyzing the incentives for technological diffusion provided
by different environmental policy instruments (see for instance van Soest (2005) and Coria
(2009)), this is the first study investigating the effects of refunding an emission tax.
Like Coria (2009), our setting makes use of the framework by Reinganum (1981), who
considers an industry composed of symmetric firms that engage in Cournot competition in
the output market. When a technology that reduces the cost of compliance with an emission
tax appears, each firm must decide when to adopt it, based in part upon the discounted
cost of implementing it and in part upon the behavior of the rival firms. If a firm adopts a
technology before its rivals, it can expect to make substantial profits at the expense of the
other firms, since the cost advantage allows it to increase its output market share. On the
other hand, the discounted sum of purchase price and adjustment costs may decline if the
adjustment period lengthens, as various quasi-fixed factors become adjustable. Therefore,
although waiting costs more in terms of forgone profits, it may save money on purchasing
the new technology. Reinganum (1981) showed that diffusion, as opposed to immediate
adoption, occurred purely due to strategic behavior in the output market, since adoptions
that yield lower incremental benefits are deferred until they are justified by lower adoption
costs.
Our results indicate that exogenous refunding of an emission tax based on output re-
sealed-bid auction. Part of the auction revenues are returned to firms, not as lump sum transfers but in a way
that firms would have incentives to bid truthfully.
2Fischer (2011) refers to exogenous refunding as ”fixed subsidy”, and to an emission tax with an endogenous
output-based rebate as the ”refunded tax”.
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inforces the mechanism described by Reinganum (1981). Hence, technology diffuses faster
into an imperfectly competitive industry if the regulator refunds the emission tax revenues
but the firms do not recognize the impact of adoption on the average emission intensity. The
intuition behind this result is straightforward: if the refund is based on output, adopters
receive a net refund as the system rewards those firms that are cleaner than average. How-
ever, the incremental effect of the refund over taxes decreases as more and more firms adopt
because of the lower overall pollution intensity and thus lower refund.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model of technological diffu-
sion. Section 3 and 4 analyze the adoption incentives provided by emission taxes with and
without refunding, respectively. Section 5 analyzes technological catching up under the two
policies. Section 6 presents numerical simulations and section 7 concludes.
2 The model
Assume an imperfectly competitive and stationary industry, where n firms choose their level
of production simultaneously and compete in quantities. The inverse demand function is
given by
P(Q) = a  bQ,
whereQ = åni=1 q
i and a, b > 0. The production technology exhibits constant returns to scale
such that total variable costs are given by
Ci = c0qi.
Production also generates emissions of a homogenous pollutant and emissions from firm
i. ei, are proportional to output qi according to
ei = #0qi.
To control emissions, the regulator has implemented a tax s that each firm must pay for
each unit of emission.
At date t = 0, an innovation in emissions abatement technology is announced. The new
technology reduces the emission intensity from #0 to #1, i.e. #1 < #0, and also changes the
marginal cost of production from c0 to c13. Firms must now decide when to adopt the new
3As noted by Fischer (2011), this characterization is suitable for end-of-pipe technologieswhich scrub a certain
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technology, taking into account the effect of the competitors’ adoption on pre- and post-
adoption profit flows. Note that c0 + s#0 > c1 + s#1 by assumption to ensure that the rate
of profit flow (quasi-rent) is higher with the new technology. Moreover, we assume that no
future technical advance is anticipated.
Let p0(m1) be the rate of (Cournot-Nash) profit flow for firm i when m1 out of n firms
have adopted the cleaner technology and firm i has not. Next, let p1(m1) be the rate of profit
flow for firm iwhenm1 firms have adopted the cleaner technology and firm i is among them.
We assume that both p0(m1) and p1(m1) are known with certainty for all m1.
Further, the following assumptions are made.
(1i) p0(m1   1)  0 and p1(m1)  0
(1ii) p1(m1   1)  p0(m1   2) > p1(m1)  p0(m1   1) > 0 for all m1  n.
Assumption (1ii) states that the increase in the profit rate from adopting as the (m1  1)th
firm should be higher than the increase in profit rate from adopting as the m1th firm. This is
to say, a firm that adopts earlier has a larger ”relative” cost advantage than if it adopts later
due to the strategic interaction in the output market.
Let ti denote firm i’s date of adoption and let p1(ti) be the present value of the in-
vestment cost for the new technology, including both purchase price and adjustment costs.
We assume that p1(t) is a differentiable convex function with p01(0)  p0(0)   p1(1) (2i),
limt !¥ p01(t) > 0 (2ii) and p
00
1 (t) > re
 rt (p1(1)  p0(0)) (2iii). Assumption (2i) ensures that
immediate adoption is too costly, while assumption 2(ii) ensures that the costs of adoption
decrease over time, but do not decrease indefinitely. This implies that there is an efficient
scale of adjustment beyond which adoption costs increase again. Moreover, assumption
2(iii) ensures that the objective function defining the optimal timing of adoption is locally
concave on the choice of adoption dates.
Further, we define Vi(t1, ..., ti 1, ti, ti+1, ..., tn) to be the present value of firm i’s profits
net of any investment costs for the new technology when firm k adopts at tk, k = 1, .., n.
Given an ordering of adoption dates t1  t2  ...  tn, we can write the present value of
firm i’s profits as
proportion of emissions. It is also a good representation of a technology that improves fuel efficiency, which
means that it reduces emissions per unit of electricity or useful heat of pollutants, which are highly correlated
with fuel use (such as CO2 and SO2).
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Vi(t1, ..., ti 1, ti, ti+1, ..., tn) =
i 1
å
m1=0
tm1+1Z
tm1
p0(m1)e rtdt+
n
å
m1=i
tm1+1Z
tm1
p1(m1)e rtdt  p1(ti),
where t0 = 0 and tn+1 = ¥.
Maximization of Vi given the ordering t1  t2  ...  tn (and thus the restriction
ti 1  ti  ti+1) gives each firm i an optimal date of adoption, ti , and is implicitly defined
by
¶Vi
¶ti
= (p0(i  1)  p1(i)) e rti   p01(ti ) = 0. (1)
This first-order condition says that it is optimal to adopt the new technology on the date
when the present value of the cost of waiting to adopt (the increase in profit rate due to
adoption) is equal to the present value of the benefit of waiting to adopt (the decrease in
investment cost). We define Dpi = p1(i)  p0(i  1) and (1) can then be written
¶Vi
¶ti
=  Dpie rti   p01(ti ) = 0,
i = 1, ..., n. Furthermore, Vi is strictly concave at ti for all i. As shown by Reinganum
(1981), there are n! sequences in which the adoption date defined by (1) is a Nash equilibrium
(demonstration in Appendix A). This result holds regardless of firms being homogenous
when the adoption decision is made at time 0.
To further encourage adoption of new abatement technologies, the regulator has consid-
ered refunding the emission tax revenues to the firms in proportion to market share. In the
following sections, we characterize one of the n! sequences of adoption, analyzing the impact
of refunding on the optimal date of adoption. That is, we analyze the difference in adoption
profits Dpi between a standard emission tax and an emission tax refunded in proportion to
output. A higher Dpi implies faster adoption (a lower ti ) because of the concavity of V
i(ti )
and vice versa.
3 Adoption incentives under an emission tax
If we have m1 adopters of the new technology and rank the firms according to their order
in the adoption sequence (taking it as given), we can write the profit rate maximization
problem for the adopters as
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p j = max
qj
[P(Q)  c1   s#1] qj,
for j = 1, 2, ...,m1   1,m1,
and the profit maximization problem for the n m1 non-adopters as
p j = max
qj
[P(Q)  c0   s#0] qj,
for j = m1 + 1,m1 + 2, ..., n  1, n.
The first order conditions for the adopters and non-adopters respectively are
P(Q) + P0(Q)qj = c1 + s#1,
j = 1, 2, ...,m1   1,m1,
P(Q) + P0(Q)qj = c0 + s#0,
j = m1 + 1,m1 + 2, ..., n  1, n.
Thus, both types of firms set marginal revenue equal to marginal costs inclusive of the
tax payment for the emissions embodied in an additional unit of output. Because marginal
cost is lower for the adopters, they produce more than non-adopters.
We define the profit-maximizing level of production for the m1 adopters under an emis-
sion tax to be qT1 and the profit-maximizing level of production for the n m1 non-adopters
to be qT0 . We further assume that q
T
0 > 0
4. Now, if we let zT0 = c0 + s#0 denote marginal costs
inclusive of emission tax payments under an emission tax before adoption of the new tech-
nology and let zT1 = c1 + s#1 denote marginal costs after adoption, the equilibrium output
levels under an emission tax for adopters and non-adopters, respectively, are
qT1 (m1) =
a  zT1 + [n m1]

zT0   zT1

b [n+ 1]
,
qT0 (m1) =
a  zT0  m1

zT0   zT1

b [n+ 1]
,
for which qT1 (m1) > q
T
0 (m1) > 0 and q
T
1 (m1)   qT1 (m1   1) = qT0 (m1)   qT0 (m1   1) < 0 _
m1  n.
4From the equilibrium output level for technology 0 given below, it is clear that this assumption is satisfied
for all m1  n  1 if a  n [c0 + s#0] + [n  1] [c1 + s#1] > 0
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Furthermore, qT1 (m1) > q
T
0 (m1   1) _m1. That is, adoption allows firms to increase their
output. Moreover, it allows adopters to increase their market share since, due to strategic
behavior in the output market, non-adopters reduce their output to offset the effect of an
increased supply on the market price.
Under an emission tax with m1 adopters of the new technology, the equilibrium profit
rate for adopters of the new technology is
pT1 (m1) = b
h
qT1 (m1)
i2
,
and the equilibrium profit rate for the non-adopters
pT0 (m1) = b
h
qT0 (m1)
i2
,
see Appendix B for derivation of equilibrium profits and output.
We can now find an expression for the increase in profit rate due to adoption for the firm
that is the ith to adopt, under an emission tax.
DpTi = b
h
qT1 (i)
i2   hqT0 (i  1)i2 . (2)
DpTi is positive but decreasing in i (in accordance with assumption 1ii and demonstrated
in Appendix A.1).
4 Adoption incentives under a refunded tax
Under an emission tax which is refunded to the regulated firms in proportion to output
market share, the profit rate maximization problem for the m1 firms which have adopted the
new technology is
p j = max
qj

[P(Q)  c1   s#1] qj + sEq
j
Q

,
for j = 1, 2, ...,m1   1,m1,
and the profit maximization problem for the n m1 non-adopters
p j = max
qj
[P(Q)  c0   s#0] qj + sEq
j
Q
,
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j = m1 + 1,m1 + 2, ..., n  1, n, with aggregate emissions (E) and aggregate output (Q) given
by:
E =
n
å
i=1
ei
Q =
n
å
i=1
qi
and the average emission intensity # given by:
# =
E
Q
. (3)
4.1 Exogenous Refunded Tax
With reference to the Swedish NOx charge, we first focus on the case where the number
of firms in the industry is large enough so that each firm considers its own impact on the
average emission intensity (and therefore also the size of the refund) as neglible5.
The first order conditions for the adopters and non-adopters respectively are then
P(Q) + P0(Q)qj = c1 + s [#1   #] , (4)
for j = 1, 2, ...,m1   1,m1,
P(Q) + P0(Q)qj = c0 + s [#0   #] , (5)
for j = m1 + 1,m1 + 2, ..., n  1, n.
Thus both types of firms set marginal revenue equal to marginal costs inclusive of the
emission tax minus the marginal refund. The marginal refund is given by the emission tax
rate times the average emission intensity and works as an implicit output subsidy. Thus,
just as under an emission tax, adopters produce more than non-adopters because of lower
marginal cost. However, output will be higher for both adopters and non-adopters under a
refunded tax because of the refund.
We define the profit-maximizing level of production for adopters under an emission tax
with exogenous refunding to be qX1 and the profit-maximizing level of production for non-
5In the case of the Swedish NOx charge, market power in the market for refunding is not a major concern.
Although participants include large producers in industries that may not be perfectly competitive, in 2000 no
plant had more than roughly 2% of the rebate market (Sterner & Ho¨glund-Isaksson, 2006), since the tax-refund
program includes several industries. Thus, by applying the program broadly, Sweden avoids the market-share
issues that could arise with sector-specific programs (see Fischer 2011).
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adopters to be qX0 . If q
T
0 > 0, the equilibrium output levels under an exogenously refunded
tax for adopters and non-adopters, respectively, are
qX1 (m1) = q
T
1 (m1) +
s#X(m1)
b [n+ 1]
, (6)
qX0 (m1) = q
T
0 (m1) +
s#X(m1)
b [n+ 1]
, (7)
where #X(m1) =
m1#1qX1 +[n m1]#0qX0
m1qX1 +[n m1]qX0
> 0. Because the average emissions intensity decreases
with the number of firms adopting the new technology6, the difference in output with and
without a refund decreases as m1 increases. Equilibrium profit rates under a refunded tax
with m1 adopters of the new technology are
pX1 (m1) = b
h
qX1 (m1)
i2
,
pX0 (m1) = b
h
qX0 (m1)
i2
,
see Appendix B for derivation of equilibrium profits and output.
We can now find an expression for the increase in profit rate due to adoption for the firm,
which is the ith to adopt, under an exogenous refunded tax.
DpXi = b
h
qX1 (i)
i2   hqX0 (i  1)i2 .
Substituting in (6), we have that
DpXi = b
24"qT1 (i) + s#X(i)b [n+ 1]
#2
 
"
qT0 (i  1) +
s#X(i  1)
b [n+ 1]
#235 . (8)
Since each firm considers its own impact on the average emission intensity as negligible,
#X(i) = #X(i  1) from the perspective of the firm, and hence (8) simplifies to
DpXi = Dp
T
i +
2s#X(i)
[n+ 1]
h
qT1 (i)  qT0 (i  1)
i
.
The difference in the increase in profit rate from adoption under a standard emission tax
6Let s1(m1) to denote themarket share of an individual adopter withm1 adopters in the industry. The average
emission intensity can be represented as #(m1) = #0 m1s1(m1)d, where d = #0  #1. Note that #(m1) < #(m1  1)
if [m1   1]s1(m1   1) < m1s1(m1). That is to say, the average emission intensity decreases with adoption if the
total output share of adopters increases with adoption.
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compared to an exogenous refunded tax is then given by
DpXi   DpTi = 2
n

zT0   zT1

b [n+ 1]2
s#X(i), (9)
since qT1 (i)  qT0 (i  1) =
n[zT0 zT1 ]
b[n+1] > 0.
Under these assumptions, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 1 A technology that reduces the emission intensity of production diffuses faster under
an exogenously refunded than under a non-refunded emission tax.
We see from (9) that, for the same tax per unit of emissions, s, DpXi > Dp
T
i . That is,
the diffusion of the new technology is faster under the exogenous refunded tax. However,
since the average emission intensity and the refund decreases as the technology diffuses into
the industry, it is optimal for the late adopters to wait longer to adopt relative to the early
adopters so that investment cost goes down further with time. The additional impact of the
refund over taxes therefore diminishes for the firms later in the adoption sequence.
4.2 Endogenous Refunded Tax
So far we have assumed that each firm considers its own impact on the average emission
intensity and thus the size of the refund as negligible. However, since firms in the present
framework have market power in the output market and emissions are proportional to out-
put, it is appropriate to also consider the case where firms have market power in the market
for refunding. If firms take into account their influence on the size of the refund, the first
order condition for the adopters are
P(Q) + P0(Q)qj = c1 + s [#1   #]

1  q
j
Q

, (10)
for j = 1, 2, ...,m1   1,m1,
and for non-adopters
P(Q) + P0(Q)qj = c0 + s [#0   #]

1  q
j
Q

, (11)
for j = m1 + 1,m1 + 2, ..., n  1, n.
Let qD1 and q
D
0 be the profit-maximizing level of production for adopters and non-adopters,
respectively, under endogenous refunding. DefiningQX (m1) = m1qX1 +[n m1] qX0 ,QD (m1) =
11
m1qD1 + [n m1] qD0 and #D(m1) = m1#1q
D
1 +[n m1]#0qD0
QD > 0, it can be shown from the equilib-
rium conditions in (4) and (5), and (10) and (11) (see Appendix C), that
QD(m1) QX(m1) = nsb [n+ 1]
h
#D(m1)  #X(m1)
i
,
i.e., total output under endogenous and exogenous refunding is the same only if the av-
erage emissions intensities #D(m1) and #X(m1) are the same. Thus, comparing the FOCs
that define the profit-maximizing level of production for adopters and non-adopters under
exogenous and endogenous refunding (i.e., equations (4)-(10) for adopters and (5)-(11) for
non-adopters), we can say that, for equivalent average emission intensity, qX1 > q
D
1 _m1 < n
and qX0 < q
D
0 _m1 > 0. Hence, more production is shifted toward non-adopters under
endogenous refunding compared to exogenous refunding for equivalent average emission
intensities (see also, Fischer 2011, pp 223). Furthermore, qX1 (n) = q
D
1 (n) and q
X
0 (0) = q
D
0 (0)
since the net tax is zero when the firms are homogenous.
As shown in Appendix B, equilibrium profit rates under an endogenous refunded tax
with m1 adopters of the new technology are
pD1 (m1) = b

1  s
bQD (m1)
h
#1   #D(m1)
i h
qD1 (m1)
i2
,
pD0 (m1) = b

1  s
bQD (m1)
h
#0   #D(m1)
i h
qD0 (m1)
i2
.
The increase in profit rate due to adoption for the firm that is the ith to adopt, under a
refunded tax with firm influence on the size of the refund, is then given by
DpDi = b
h
qD1 (i)
i2   hqD0 (i  1)i2 (12)
+ s
"
#0   #D(i  1)

QD (i  1)
h
qD0 (i  1)
i2   #1   #D(i)
QD (i)
h
qD1 (i)
i2#
.
By using equation (3), and that #0 = #1 + d with d > 0, we can write:
#0   #D(m1) = m1sD1 (m1)d, (13)
#1   #D(m1) =   [n m1] sD0 (m1)d,
where sD1 (m1) and s
D
0 (m1) represent the market shares of an individual adopter and non-
adopter, respectively, with m1 adopters in the industry.
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Substituting (13) into (12) yields:
DpDi = b
h
qD1 (i)
i2   hqD0 (i  1)i2 (14)
+ sd
h
[i  1] sD0 (i  1)sD1 (i  1)qD0 (i  1) + [n  i] sD0 (i)sD1 (i)qD1 (i)
i
.
Unfortunately, equations (14) cannot be easily compared to (2) or (8) since output levels
and emission intensities are endogenous. Nevertheless, to be able to say something about the
impact of firms’ strategically influencing the size of the refund and the adoption decision, we
follow the approach in Fischer (2011) and compare adoption incentives between exogenous
and endogenous refunding for an equivalent average emission intensity. That is to say, we
compare adoption profits under exogenous vs. endogenous refunding for the firms which
are the first and last to adopt. This yields:
DpD1   DpX1 = b
h
qD1 (1)
i2   hqX1 (1)i2+ sd [n  1] sD0 (1)sD1 (1)qD1 (1), (15)
and
DpDn   DpXn = b
h
qX0 (n  1)
i2   hqD0 (n  1)i2 (16)
+ sd [n  1] sD0 (n  1)sD1 (n  1)qD0 (n  1).
Note that the first term (in brackets) on the right hand side of equations (15) and (16)
is negative, while the second term is positive. Therefore, equations (15) and (16) indicate
that it is ambiguous whether adoption will be slower under endogenous than under exoge-
nous refunding because of the existence of two counteracting effects, an ”output” effect and
a ”refunding” effect. Firstly, as stated before, for equivalent average emissions intensities,
production is shifted toward non-adopters under endogenous refunding. Consequently, this
production shifting lowers the benefit of adoption under endogenous versus exogenous re-
funding for the firms which are the first and last to adopt. Secondly, the magnitude of the
refund has an effect. Because production is shifted toward non-adopters, the average emis-
sion intensity is larger under endogenous refunding, and so is the refund, which increases
the benefits of adoption under endogenous versus exogenous refunding.
Overall, we expect the first effect to dominate. Moreover, the larger the number of firms
in the industry, the smaller should be the difference between exogenous and endogenous
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refunding, because the strategic interaction between firms in the output market is reduced
in such a case. Note also that the second effect depends critically on the effect of adoption
on emissions per unit of output, i.e., the larger is d, the larger the increase in emissions
from shifting production toward non-adopters, and the larger is the second effect. These
observations lead to the following proposition.
Proposition 2 A technology that reduces the emission intensity of production tends to diffuse more
slowly under an endogenously vs. an exogenously refunded emission tax the more concentrated the
industry is.
Next, we compare the adoption incentives under an endogenous refunded tax and an
emission tax for the firm which is first to adopt and the firm which is the last, nth, firm to
adopt. This yields:
DpD1   DpT1 =
h
DpD1   DpX1
i
+ 2
n

zT0   zT1

b [n+ 1]2
s#0,
and
DpDn   DpTn =
h
DpDn   DpXn
i
+ 2
n

zT0   zT1

b [n+ 1]2
s#1.
The difference in profit increase for endogenous refunding versus a non-refunded emis-
sion tax is given by the sum of the difference between endogenous and exogenous refunding
(the first term), and the difference between exogenous refunding and an emission tax (the
second term). As discussed previously, the first term is on the net likely to be negative while
the second is positive. Hence, compared to exogenous refunding, it is clear that taxes are
less likely to induce a faster diffusion than endogenous refunding. Nevertheless, it is still
the case that the ”output” effect should dominate the ”refunding” effect if the number of
firms in the industry is small, to the extent that diffusion is likely to be slower under en-
dogenous refunding. These observations lead to the following proposition.
Proposition 3 A technology that reduces the emission intensity of production tends to diffuse more
slowly under an endogenously refunded vs. a non-refunded emission tax the more concentrated the
industry is.
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5 Incentives for continuous technological upgrading
In the previous sections, we showed under what conditions exogenous refunding helps to
speed up the path of technology adoption. However, this positive effect of refunding dis-
sipates as the average emission intensity of the industry decreases. In order to analyze to
what extent refunding provides continuous increased incentives for technological upgrad-
ing, we consider the case when further technological advance occurs at some point in the
future. This new technology, which we will call technology 2, unexpectedly arrives at some
time t2 after kT and kX firms would have already adopted technology 1 under an emission
tax and an exogenous refunded tax, respectively. As shown in the previous sections, since
the exogenous refund induces a faster adoption than the emission tax, kX  kT.
We study the difference in adoption incentives for the new technology provided by these
instruments for three groups: (1) the laggards - those firms that would not have adopted
technology 1 at t2 either under the emission tax or the refunded tax (i.e., n  kX firms), (2)
the intermediates - those firms that would have adopted technology 1 at t2 under refunding,
but would not have adopted under an emission tax (i.e., kX   kT firms), and finally, (3) the
early adopters - those firms that would have adopted technology 1 at t2 under both schemes
(i.e., kT firms). If refunding provides a continuous and larger incentive to technological
upgrading than taxes, we should expect the difference in the increase in profit rate from
adoption with and without refunding to be positive for all groups. Moreover, if refunding
produces a ”catching up” effect - understood as an increased incentive for firms dirtier than
average to adopt new technologies, we should expect the difference in profit increase for the
laggards to be unambiguously positive.
Technology 2 is characterized by a marginal production cost c2 and emission intensity
#2, with #2 < #1 < #0. Let zT2 = c2 + s#2. By assumption, we have that z
T
0 > z
T
1 > z
T
2 .
Now let m1 be the number of adopters of technology 1 and m2 be the number of adopters
of technology 2. At time t2, we thus have m1 = k and m2 = 0. Further, let p2(m1,m2) be
the profit rate for firm j when m1 firms have adopted technology 1, m2 firms have adopted
technology 2, and firm j is among the adopters of technology 2. We define p1(m1,m2) and
p0(m1,m2) accordingly. The firm which has not adopted technology 1 at time t2 now has the
choice between two technologies. However, for simplicity, we assume that p2(t), the present
value cost at time t2 of investing in technology 2 at t, is not larger than the cost of investing in
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technology 1 at t, i.e., p2(t)  p1(t)ert2 for t  t2. This implies that it will never be profitable
to adopt technology 1 once technology 2 has appeared7.
The lower marginal costs imply higher profit rates with technology 2 compared to both
technology 1 and technology 0. The increase in profit rates from adoption of technology 2
will thus be higher for a firmwhich produces with technology 0 than for a firmwhich has al-
ready adopted technology 1. I.e., the following conditions apply: p2(m1,m2) > p1(m1,m2) >
p0(m1,m2) as well as p2(m1,m2 + 1)  p0(m1,m2) > p2(m1  1,m2 + 1)  p1(m1,m2) for all
m1,m2 for which m1 + m2 < n. Furthermore, we assume that p2(t) (defined for t  t2) is
a differentiable convex function for which p02(t2)  p0(k, 0)   p2(k, 1), limt !¥ p02(t) > 0
and p002 (t) > re rt (p2(k, 1)  p0(k, 0)) . Lastly, we define Dp02,j = p2(k, j)  p0(k, j  1) and
Dp12,j = p2(n  j, j)  p1(n  j+ 1, j  1).
We can now determine the optimal adoption dates for technology 2 for the three groups
of firms from first order conditions similar to (1) (see more details on the results in this
section in Appendix D). The n  k firms which produce with technology 0 at t2 will first find
it profitable to adopt technology 2 at tj , implicitly defined by
Dp02,j e
 r[tj  t2]   p02(tj ) = 0
for j = 1, 2, ...,m1   1, n   k,, and the k firms which produce with technology 1 at t2 will
adopt technology 2 at tj , implicitly defined by
Dp12,j e
 r[tj  t2]   p02(tj ) = 0
for j = n  k+ 1, n  k+ 2, ..., n  1, n.
To analyze the schedule of adoption dates for technology 2, we again need to analyze the
difference in the increase in profit rate from adoption with and without refunding for each
position in the adoption sequence.
Under an emission tax, equilibrium output and profit levels for the three technologies
are8
qT0 (m1,m2) =
a  zT0  m1

zT0   zT1
 m2 zT0   zT2 
b [n+ 1]
,
7This is not a necessary condition for technology 2 to always be preferred. What is required is that the net
present value of adopting technology 2 at some point in time after t2 is always greater than the net present value
of adopting technology 1.
8As seen from the expression below, qT0 > 0 if a  z0  m1 [z0   z1] m2 [z0   z2] > 0
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qT1 (m1,m2) =
a  zT1   [n m1  m2]

zT1   zT0
 m2 zT1   zT2 
b [n+ 1]
,
qT2 (m1,m2) =
a  zT2   [n m1  m2]

zT2   zT0
 m1 zT2   zT1 
b [n+ 1]
,
and
pT0 (m1,m2) = b
h
qT0 (m1,m2)
i2
,
pT1 (m1,m2) = b
h
qT1 (m1,m)
i2
,
pT2 (m1,m2) = b
h
qT2 (m1,m2)
i2
.
Under the exogenously refunded tax, the expressions corresponding to the case with two
technologies are
qX0 (m1,m2) = q
T
0 (m1,m2) +
s#X(m1,m2)
b [n+ 1]
,
qX1 (m1,m2) = q
T
1 (m1,m2) +
s#X(m1,m2)
b [n+ 1]
,
qX2 (m1,m2) = q
T
2 (m1,m2) +
s#X(m1,m2)
b [n+ 1]
,
and
pX0 (m1,m2) = b
h
qX0 (m1,m2)
i2
= b
"
qT0 (m1,m2) +
s#X(m1,m2)
b [n+ 1]
#2
,
pX1 (m1,m2) = b
h
qX1 (m1,m2)
i2
= b
"
qT1 (m1,m2) +
s#X(m1,m2)
b [n+ 1]
#2
,
pX2 (m1,m2) = b
h
qX2 (m1,m2)
i2
= b
"
qT2 (m1,m2) +
s#X(m1,m2)
b [n+ 1]
#2
.
where
#X(m1,m2) =
m2#2qX2 (m1,m2) +m1#1q
X
1 (m1,m2) + [n m1  m2] #0qX0 (m1,m2)
m2qX2 (m1,m2) +m1q
X
1 (m1,m2) + [n m1  m2] qX0 (m1,m2)
.
Laggards
Let us first analyze the difference in the increase in profit rate from adoption of technol-
ogy 2 with and without refunding for the laggards which would not have adopted technol-
ogy 1 by t2 under either policy and are therefore producing with technology 0. Because
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#R(kR, j) = #R(kR, j   1) from the perspective of the firm under exogenous refunding, the
difference in the profit rate increase from adoption of technology 2 under the exogenous
refunded tax compared to the emission tax is
DpX02,j   DpT02,j = 2
n

zT0   zT2

b [n+ 1]2
hh
kT   kX
i h
zT0   zT1
i
+ s#X(kX, j)
i
, (17)
for j = 1, 2, ..., n  kX   1, n  kX.
If kX = kT, we have from (17) that, analogous to the result with two technologies,
DpX02,j > Dp
T
02,j. Hence, the adopters of technology 2 switching from technology 0 would
invest earlier under the refunded tax than under an emission tax. However, if kX > kT,
the sign of this expression is ambiguous. A negative sign would indicate faster diffusion
of technology 2 under an emission tax than a refunded tax. The explanation for this possi-
ble outcome is simple: switching to technology 2 from technology 0 under the emission tax
can be more profitable if there are fewer competitors with technology 1 and instead more
competitors with technology 0. The sign of (17) is negative and adoption is faster under an
emission tax if the difference in profit increase coming from higher output under an emis-
sion tax is larger than the profit increase coming from the refund.
Intermediates
Let us now examine the difference in profits for the intermediates, which only exist if the
number of firms which would have adopted technology 1 by t2 under the emission tax is
lower than the number of adopters of technology 1 at t2 under the exogenous refunded tax,
i.e., kT < kX. The jth adopter, for which j 2 n  kX + 1, n  kT, would switch from tech-
nology 0 under an emission tax, and from technology 1 under a refunded tax. In the eyes of
the firms, #X(n  j, j) = #X(n  j+ 1, j  1). Therefore, the difference between the policies in
adoption time is determined by the following:
DpX12,j   DpT02,j =
n

zT0   zT1

b [n+ 1]2
h
2kT
h
zT0   zT2
i
  [n  2j]
h
zT0 + z
T
1   2zT2
i
  2
h
a+ zT2
ii
+ 2
n[zT1   zT2 ]
b [n+ 1]2
s#X(n  j, j), (18)
for j 2 n  kX + 1, n  kT.
The sign of (18) is ambiguous, so the intermediates would adopt either earlier or later un-
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der an exogenous refunded tax compared to a standard emission tax.
Early adopters
Finally, let us analyze the incentives to adopt technology 2 under the emission tax and the
refunded tax for those firms that would have adopted technology 1 by t2 under both policies,
i.e., the early adopters. When the first of the firms with technology 1 invests in technology 2,
there is no longer any firm using technology 0. This means that there are again only two
production technologies in the market and that results are comparable to the ones in section
4.1. Because #X(n  j, j) = #X(n  j+ 1, j  1) from the perspective of the firm, the difference
in profit rate increase is given by:
DpX12,j   DpT12,j =
2n

zT1   zT2

b [n+ 1]2
s#X(n  j, j) (19)
for j = n  kT + 1, n  kT + 2, ..., n  1, n.
(19) is positive. This indicates that the jth adopter of technology 2, which would switch
from technology 1 under both policies, invests earlier under the refunded tax than under a
standard emission tax.
In sum, our results indicate that, although exogenous refunding provides continuous
incentives for technological upgrading, these incentives are not unambiguously larger than
those provided by an emission tax. This is particularly the case for firms that are dirtier
than average (the so- called laggards). In relative terms, the gains of investing in a new
technology, in terms of increased output and refunding, dissipates as the overall industry
becomes cleaner. The previous findings can be summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 A technology that reduces the emission intensity of production does not unambigu-
ously diffuse faster under an exogenously refunded tax than under a non-refunded emission tax
among those firms that are dirtier than average.
6 Numerical illustrations
In the following, we present simulations on the diffusion patterns and welfare effects under
a standard emission tax as well as exogenous and endogenous refunding.
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6.1 Diffusion
To illustrate the diffusion patterns under the policies and how the patterns are affected by the
degree of market concentration, we present numerical simulations for an industry composed
of 5 and 15 firms, respectively. For the simulations, we assume the following function for the
present value of the investment cost
p1(t) = K1e [q+r]t
where q > 0 captures drivers such as learning and technological progress which lead to
decreasing investment costs over time (here assumed exogenous and generating a constant
rate of decrease in costs). We assume q = 3%, r = 6% and K1 = 20 and for the remaining
parameters a = 10, b = 1, #0 = 1, #1 = 0.5, c0 = c1 = 1 and s = 1.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the adoption times for each firm in the sequence. We see from
Figure 1 with n = 5 firms that, for this set of parameters, the exogenous refunded tax in-
duces a faster diffusion than the non-refunded emission tax, just as discussed in section 4.1.
However, with endogenous refunding, the firms would adopt later than under exogenous
refunding, as well as later than they would under a non-refunded emission tax. Figure 3
illustrates the contribution from the ”output” and ”refunding” effects to the difference be-
tween endogenous and exogenous refunding. As discussed in section 4.2, the output effect
dominates the refunding effect, such that, on net, the difference is negative for each adopter
in the adoption sequence. We also see that, even though the additional difference between
exogenous refunding and a non-refunded tax is positive, the net difference between endoge-
nous refunding and an emission tax is still negative.
With n = 15 firms in Figure 2, diffusion takes longer since gains from adoption are lower.
Here, also, the exogenous refunded tax induces faster diffusion than the non-refunded emis-
sion tax. However, with endogenous refunding, the first firm would adopt at a point in
time very close to but later than the adoption time under the emission tax, while the last
firm would adopt earlier than under an emission tax and at a point in time very close to the
adoption time under the exogenous refunded tax. With n = 15 firms, differences in adoption
times are, however, relatively small. This illustrates that, as the number of firms increases,
the diffusion pattern under a refunded tax also approaches the pattern under a standard
emission tax.
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In Figure 4, the difference in profit increase between endogenous and exogenous refund-
ing is disaggregated into ”output” and ”refunding” effects with 15 firms in the industry. It
is still true that the output effect dominates the refunding effect such that diffusion is slower
under endogenous versus exogenous refunding for each firm in the sequence. However, the
relatively larger difference in profit increase between exogenous refunding and an emission
tax implies that, on net, endogenous refunding induces faster adoption than an emission tax
for all but the first firm in the adoption sequence, as also noted from Figure 2. Figure 4 also
illustrates that, for n = 15, the outcome under endogenous refunding is well approximated
by the outcome under exogenous refunding for firms later in the adoption sequence.
6.2 Welfare
The policies have different effects on welfare because of the different patterns of adoption.
Faster diffusion of the cost-reducing technology raises consumer surplus and lowers en-
vironmental damages in present value terms for the whole diffusion period but also raises
total investment costs. Welfare effects are also different under the policies because, evenwith
the same number of adopters at a certain point in time, equilibrium output and aggregate
emissions differ9.
With m1 adopters of the new technology, consumer surplus is given by
CS(m1) =
b
2
[Q(m1)]2
We assume that the emitted substance is a flow pollutant which causes damages only in
the current period and has a constant value of marginal damage from emissions d = 1. Total
environmental damages D at a point in time with m1 adopters of the new technology is then
given by
D(m1) = dE(m1)
Net tax revenues are TR(m1) = sE(m1) under the emission tax. In contrast, TR(m1) = 0
under the refunded tax since all the tax revenues are refunded back to the firms and included
in firm profits.
9The welfare comparison is made between outcomes under the two policies for the same level of the emission
tax. Because of the refund, equilibrium output and aggregate emissions differ. From a welfare comparison
perspective, one could argue that the relevant comparison is between different tax rates under the two policies
which induce the same level of aggregate emissions. However, for this model, there is no emission tax level
other than zero that induces the same level of emissions under the two policies before diffusion has started and
after the technology has completely diffused into the industry.
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The welfare rate (or instantaneous welfare), w(m1), excluding investment costs, with
m1 adopters of the new technology is the sum of consumer surplus, firm profits and tax
revenues minus environmental damages and is given by
w(m1) = CS(m1) + [n m1]p0(m1) +m1p1(m1) + TR(m1)  D(m1)
Total discounted welfareW net of investment costs can now be written
W =
n
å
m1=0
264
tm1+1Z
tm1
w(m1)e rtdt
375  nå
m1=1
p(tm1)
with t0 = 0 and tn+1 = ¥.
Tables 1 and 2 show the welfare levels over time under an emission tax, an exogenous
refunded tax and an endogenous refunded tax with 5 and 15 firms, respectively. Adoption
times are the same as in the previous section, with tm1 determining the start of the m1th
period with current value of the welfare rate w(m1) at each point in time. We see from table
1 that, for n = 5, discounted welfare is similar under exogenous and endogenous refunding.
It appears that the benefit of reaching higher welfare rates with the faster diffusion in the
first case is matched by the benefit of lower investment cost with slower diffusion in the
second.
Discounted welfare is lower under the emission tax compared to both refunding situa-
tions. This is not driven by differences in how early clean production is traded for lower
investment cost but by a difference in the level of welfare. This welfare difference comes
from the fact that we have assumed that consumer surplus is quadratic in aggregate pro-
duction while environmental damage is linear in aggregate emissions. This leads to higher
welfare rates with a refund since more production is valued more highly than less emissions
at the margin. Had we assumed that environmental damages were quadratic in aggregate
emissions, the opposite would have been true, i.e., welfare rates would have been higher
without refunding.
Table 2 shows the welfare outcomes with n = 15 firms. Comparing outcomes for the
same policy with n = 5 and n = 15, consumer surplus and emissions are higher and firm
profits lower for all three policy situations. With more competition in the industry, the ben-
efits of adoption for an individual firm are significantly lower and therefore diffusion is
slower than with only five firms in the industry. Both welfare rates and adoption times are
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so similar with 15 firms that there is, in practice, no difference in the value of discounted
welfare across policies.
Note that, when it comes to output, our simulations indicate that non-adopters do pro-
duce slightly more and adopters slightly less with endogenous refunding compared to the
case with exogenous refunding in line with Fischer (2011) and as discussed in section 4.2.
However, at the aggregate level, output does not differ significantly between the two re-
funding situations, which explains why consumer surplus is almost the same in both cases.
Figures 5 and 6 illustrates how the level of aggregate emissions develops over time under
the different policies. The figures show that the difference in the level of aggregate emissions
between the policies is smaller after the new technology has been completely diffused into
the industry. This is driven by the fact that the additional output under the refunded tax is
then produced with lower emission intensity, and also because the difference in aggregate
output is smaller between the two policies.
7 Conclusions
The main conclusion is that a refunded emission tax speeds up diffusion in an imperfectly
competitive industry relative to a non-refunded emission tax if firms do not strategically
influence the size of the refund. If they do, diffusion is, in contrast, likely to be slower than
under a non-refunded emission tax if the industry is highly concentrated.
It is straightforward to see that, as the number of firms increases and the equilibrium
comes closer to the outcome under perfect competition, the difference in diffusion patterns
with andwithout refunding goes to zero. However, our findings are only valid in the context
of an outputmarket that is not perfectly competitive. If there is perfect competition, diffusion
is not an equilibrium since, in that case, adoption would yield the same incremental benefits
to all firms.
These results should apply to end-of-pipe technologies that convert a certain proportion
of emissions. For energy production, the findings also should be valid for fuel efficiency
improving technologies when it comes to pollutants such as CO2 and SO2. The implications
of refunding for other types of abatement technologies is a potential area for future research.
Our results are based on the assumption that firms do not anticipate the appearance of
a more efficient technology farther into the future. Allowing for such anticipation should
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delay optimal adoption times but, for this to alter the main comparative results, the effect of
refunding would have to interact with the anticipation effect.
We have focused only on the incentives to technological diffusion provided by output-
based refunding. Refunding might also be based on investments in abatement technologies,
like the Norwegian NOx fund from which emission fee revenues are refunded in proportion
to abatement expenditure (see Hagem et al., 2012). Such a case is outside the scope of our
study, and further research is needed to understand the incentives provided by that type of
scheme.
The welfare implications of the differences in diffusion patterns under our particular as-
sumptions appear to be small. There could be a more relevant difference from a welfare
point of view if faster diffusion also speeds up learning and endogenously lowers invest-
ment costs. There should also be larger benefits to faster diffusion if emissions are a stock
pollutant.
The fact that the rate of technology adoption is influenced by (exogenous) refunding is
potentially good news for a regulator, who has political constraints on the level of the tax to
be imposed, but wants to promote faster uptake of existing abatement technologies as a way
to speed up the pace of emission reductions.
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Figure 1: Diffusion with 5 firms in the industry
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Figure 2: Diffusion with 15 firms in the industry
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Figure 5: Aggregate emissions over time with 5 firms in the industry.
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Figure 6: Aggregate emissions over time with 15 firms in the industry.
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Appendices
A Demonstration of Nash equilibrium - Reinganum (1981)
(1i) p0(m  1)  0 and p1(m)  0
(1ii) p1(m  1)  p0(m  2) > p1(m)  p0(m  1) > 0 for all m < n.
(2i) p0(0)  p0(0)  p1(1)
(2ii) limt !¥ p0(t) > 0
(2iii) p00(t) > re rt (p1(1)  p0(0))
Demonstration very similar to Reinganum (1981).
Proposition Given a weak ordering of adoption dates t1  t2  ...  tn, each firm has a
unique optimal adoption date ti such that 0  t1 < t2 < .. < tn < ¥.
Proof From assumption 1 and 2iii, Vi is strictly concave in ti for ti 2 (ti 1, ti+1), so first-
order conditions are necessary and sufficient for finding an optimal date of adoption ti .
Furthermore, by assumption 2i ¶V
1
¶t1 t1=0
= p0(0)  p1(1)  p0(0)  0 and thus t1  0. By
assumption 2ii limt !¥ p0(t) > 0 , it also follows that limtn !¥ ¶V
n
¶tn
=  p0(tn) < 0 which
implies that tn < ¥.
We also need to show that ti 2 (ti 1, ti+1). If we evaluate ¶V
i
¶ti
at ti = ti 1, we get
¶Vi
¶ti ti=ti 1
= (p0(i  1)  p1(i)) e rti 1   p0(ti 1)
= (p0(i  1)  p1(i)) e rti 1   (p0(i  2)  p1(i  1)) e rti 1
which is strictly positive by assumption 1ii.
Similarly, we evaluate ¶V
i
¶ti
at ti = ti+1
¶Vi
¶ti ti=ti+1
= (p0(i  1)  p1(i)) e rti+1   p0(ti+1)
= (p0(i  1)  p1(i)) e rti 1   (p0(i)  p1(i+ 1)) e rti 1
which is strictly negative by assumption 1ii.
Since Vi is strictly concave in ti and ¶V
i
¶ti ti=t

i
= 0, the unique maximum is achieved at
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ti 2 (ti 1, ti+1). Q.E.D.
We also need to demonstrate that t = (t1 , t

2 , .., t

n ) is a Nash equilibrium.
Proposition t = (t1 , t

2 , .., t

n ) as defined by (1) is a Nash equilibrium in adoption dates.
Proof If t = (t1 , t

2 , .., t

n ) is a Nash equilibrium itmust be that, given t1 , t

2 , .., t

i 1, t

i+1, ..., t

n ,
i will prefer ti to any other date T. First, suppose i chooses a T 2

tk 1, t

k

where k < i
Vi(t1 , t

2 , .., t

i 1, t

i+1, ..., t

n , T) =
k 2
å
m=0
tm+1Z
tm
p0(m)e rtdt+
TZ
tk 1
p0(k  1)e rtdt
+
tkZ
T
p1(k)e rtdt+
i 2
å
m=k
tm+1Z
tm
p1(m+ 1)e rtdt
+
ti+1Z
ti 1
p1(i)e rtdt+
n
å
m=i+1
tm+1Z
tm
p1(m)e rtdt  p(T)
Maximizing with respect to T gives
(p0(k  1)  p1(k)) e rT   p0(T) = 0
That is T = tk . That is, in each interval

tk 1, t

k

, with k < i, Vi reaches its maximum
at the right boundary tk .
Next, suppose i chooses a T 2 tk , tk+1 where k > i
Vi(t1 , t

2 , .., t

i 1, t

i+1, ..., t

n , T) =
i 2
å
m=0
tm+1Z
tm
p0(m)e rtdt+
ti+1Z
ti 1
p0(i  1)e rtdt
+
k 2
å
m=i
tm+1Z
tm
p0(m)e rtdt+
TZ
tk
p0(k  1)e rtdt
+
tk+1Z
T
p1(k)e rtdt+
n
å
m=k+1
tm+1Z
tm
p1(m)e rtdt  p(T)
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Maximizing with respect to T gives
(p0(k  1)  p1(k)) e rT   p0(T) = 0
That is, T = tk . That is, in each interval

tk , t

k+1

, with k > i, Vi reaches its maximum
at the left boundary tk . Thus, the maximum of V
i must be in

ti 1, t

i+1

. We already know
from the previous demonstration that the maximum on that interval is ti . We have thus
demonstrated that, given t1 , t

2 , .., t

i 1, t

i+1, ..., t

n , iwill prefer T = ti to all other T 2 [0,¥) .
t = (t1 , t

2 , .., t

n ) is therefore a Nash equilibrium. Q.E.D
A.1 Assumption 1ii)
For the existence of a Nash equilibrium, we need to check that assumption 1ii holds under
the different policies.
A.1.1 Emission tax
Let us consider first the case of taxes. Let zT1 = c1 + s#1, z
T
0 = c0 + s#0 and r =
1
b[n+1]2
. Then,
p1(m1   1) = r
h
a  [n m1 + 2] zT1 + [n m1 + 1] zT0
i2
,
p0(m1   2) = r
h
a+ [m1   2] zT1   [m1   1] zT0
i2
,
and thus DpTm1 1 = p1(m1   1)  p0(m1   2) is equal to:
DpTm1 1 = r
h
zT1 + z
T
0
i h
n2
h
zT1 + z
T
0
i
  2n
h
a+ [m1   2] zT1 + [m1   1] zT0
ii
.
By analogy, DpTm1 = p1(m1)  p0(m1   1) is equal to:,
DpTm1 = r
h
zT1 + z
T
0
i h
n2
h
zT1 + z
T
0
i
  2n
h
a+ [m1   1] zT1 +m1zT0
ii
.
and hence:
DpTm1 1   DpTm1 = 2nr
h
zT1 + z
T
0
i2
> 0 _ _m1  2.
That is, assumption 1ii holds under the emission tax.
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A.1.2 Exogenous refunded tax
Since under the exogenously refunded tax #X(m1) = #X(m1   1), DpXm1 1   DpXm1 can be
represented as:
DpXm1 1   DpXm1 = DpTm1 1   DpTm1+ (20)
2s#X(m1)
b [n+ 1]
hh
qT1 (m1   1)  qT0 (m1   2)
i
 
h
qT1 (m1)  qT0 (m1   1)
ii
, (21)
Since qT1 (m1)  qT0 (m1   1) =
n[zT1 zT0 ]
b[n+1] , equation (20) simplifies to:
DpXm1 1   DpXm1 = 2nr
h
zT1 + z
T
0
i2
> 0 _m1  2.
A.1.3 Endogenous refunded tax
DpDm1 1   DpDm1 = b

1  s
bQD (m1   1)
h
#1   #D(m1   1)
i h
qD1 (m1   1)
i2
  b

1  s
bQD (m1   2)
h
#0   #D(m1   2)
i h
qD0 (m1   2)
i2
  b

1  s
bQD (m1)
h
#1   #D(m1)
i h
qD1 (m1)
i2
+ b

1  s
bQD (m1   1)
h
#0   #D(m1   1)
i h
qD0 (m1   1)
i2
.
Since #0   #D(m1) = m1sD1 (m)d, and #1   #D(m1) =   [n m1] sD0 (m1)d, this equation can be
represented as:
DpDm1 1   DpDm1 = b

1+
sd [n m1 + 1] sD0 (m1   1)
bQD (m1   1)
 h
qD1 (m1   1)
i2
  b

1  sd [m1   2] s
D
1 (m1   2)
bQD (m1   2)
 h
qD0 (m1   2)
i2
  b

1+
sd [n m1] sD0 (m1)
bQD (m1)
 h
qD1 (m1)
i2
+ b

1  sd [m1   1] s
D
1 (m1   1)
bQD (m1   1)
 h
qD0 (m1   1)
i2
.
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DpDm1 1   DpDm1 > 0 _m1  2 if and only if:
b
h
qD1 (m1   1)
i2   hqD1 (m1)i2
+ sd [n m1]
h
sD0 (m1   1)sD1 (m1   1)qD1 (m1   1)  sD0 (m1)sD1 (m1)qD1 (m1)
i
+ sdsD0 (m1   1)sD1 (m1   1)qD1 (m1   1)
>
b
h
qD0 (m1   2)
i2   hqD0 (m1   1)i2
+ sd [m1   1]
h
sD0 (m1   1)sD1 (m1   1)qD0 (m1   1)  sD0 (m1   2)sD1 (m1   2)qD0 (m1   2)
i
+ sdsD0 (m1   2)sD1 (m1   2)qD0 (m1   2).
We have that sD0 (m1   1)sD1 (m1   1)qDj (m1   1) ' sD0 (m1)sD1 (m1)qDj (m1) _m1 6= 1, n & j 2
f0, 1g10 and thus this expression simplifies to:
b
h
qD1 (m1   1)
i2   hqD0 (m1   2)i2+ sdsD0 (m1   1)sD1 (m1   1)qD1 (m1   1)
>
b
h
qD1 (m1)
i2   hqD0 (m1   1)i2+ sdsD0 (m1   2)sD1 (m1   2)qD0 (m1   2).
Finally, if qD1 (m1) > q
D
0 (m1   1) _ m1  2, we expect this condition to be satisfied.
B Cournot equilbrium with two technologies
We leave the completely analogous derivation of the equiilbrium for three technologies to
the interested reader.
B.1 Emission tax
Let zT0 = c0 + s#0 denote marginal costs inclusive of emission tax payments under an emis-
sion tax before adoption of the new technology and let zT1 = c1 + s#1 denote marginal costs
after adoption. If we have m1 adopters of the new technology and rank the firms accord-
ing to their order in the adoption sequence (taking it as given), we can write the profit rate
maximization problem for the adopters as
10Note that sD1 (0) = 0, and s
D
0 (n) = 0.
38
p j = max
qj
h
P(Q)  zT1
i
qj,
for j  m1,
and the profit maximization problem for the n m1 non-adopters as
p j = max
qj
h
P(Q)  zT0
i
qj,
for j > m1
Substituting in P(Q) = a  båni=1 qi, the first order condition for the adopters is
qj =
a  båi 6=j qi   zT1
2b
,
and the first order condition for the non-adopters
qj =
a  båi 6=k qi   zT0
2b
.
Since the m1 adopters are symmetric they will all have the same profit-maximizing level
of production. We denote this profit-maximizing level qT1 . Similarly, the level of production
is the same for all n  m1 non-adopters and we denote this profit-maximizing level qT0 . We
thus have the following equilibrium conditions
qT1 =
a  b [m1   1] qT1 + [n m1] qT0   zT1
2b
,
qT0 =
a  b m1qT1 + [n m1   1] qT0   zT0
2b
.
Solving for qT1 and q
T
0 , we find the levels of equilibrium output for adopters and non-
adopters, respectively
qT1 (m) =
a  zT1 + [n m1]

zT0   zT1

b [n+ 1]
,
qT0 (m) =
a  zT0  m1

zT0   zT1

b [n+ 1]
, (22)
yielding equilibrium price
PT(m) =
a+m1zT1 + [n m1] zT0
[n+ 1]
,
39
and equilibrium profits for adopters and non-adopters, respectively,
pT1 (m1) =
h
PT(m1)  zT1
i
qT1 (m1) =

a+m1zT1 + [n m1] zT0
[n+ 1]
  z1

qT1 (m1) = b
h
qT1 (m1)
i2
.
pT0 (m1) =
h
PT(m1)  zT0
i
qT0 (m1) =

a+m1zT1 + [n m1] zT0
[n+ 1]
  z0

qT0 (m1) = b
h
qT0 (m1)
i2
.
For interior solutions with qT0 (m1) > 0 for all m1 < n, we see from (22) that this requires
a  z0   [n  1] [z0   z1] > 0 to be true.
B.2 Exogenously refunded tax
Similarly, under an exogenously refunded tax, the profit maximization problems for the
adopters and non-adopters, respectively, are
p j = max
qj

[P(Q)  c1   s#1] qj + sEq
j
Q

= max
qj
h
P(Q)  zT1 + s#
i
qj, (23)
for j = 1, 2, ...,m1   1,m1,
p j = max
qj
[P(Q)  c0   s#0] qj + sEq
j
Q
= max
qj
h
P(Q)  zT0 + s#
i
qj, (24)
for j = m1 + 1,m1 + 2, ..., n  1, n.
with aggregate emissions (E) and aggregate output (Q) are given by:
E =
n
å
i=1
#iqi.
Q =
n
å
i=1
qi.
First-order conditions for the adopters and non-adopters are
qj =
a  båi 6=j qi   zT1 + s#
2b
,
for j = 1, 2, ...,m1   1,m1, and
qj =
a  båi 6=j qi   zT0 + s#
2b
,
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for j = m1 + 1,m1 + 2, ..., n  1, n.
Substituting in the profit-maximizing levels qX1 for the m1 adopters and q
X
0 for the n m1
non-adopters, we can write
qX1 (m1) =
a  zT1 + [n m1]

zT0   zT1

+ s#X(m1)
b [n+ 1]
= qT1 (m1) +
s#X(m1)
b [n+ 1]
,
qX0 (m1) =
a  zT0  m1

zT0   zT1

+ s#X(m1)
b [n+ 1]
= qT0 (m1) +
s#X(m1)
b [n+ 1]
.
and the average emission intensity is #X(m1) =
m1#1qX1 +[n m1]#0qX0
m1qX1 +[n m1]qX0
> 0.
PX(m) =
a+m1zT1 + [n m1] zT0   sn#X(m1)
[n+ 1]
Equilibrium profits for adopters and non-adopters, respectively,
pX1 (m1) =
h
PX(m1)  zT1 + s#X(m1)
i
qX1 (m1) =
"
a  zT1 + [n m1]

zT0   zT1

+ s#X(m1)
[n+ 1]
#
qX1 (m1),
= b
h
qX1 (m1)
i2
,
pX0 (m1) =
h
PX(m1)  zT0 + s#X(m1)
i
qX0 (m1) =
"
a  zT0 +m1

zT1   zT0

+ s#X(m1)
[n+ 1]
#
qx0(m1),
= b
h
qX0 (m1)
i2
.
B.3 Endogenously refunded tax
Under an endogenously refunded tax, the profit maximization problems for the adopters
and non-adopters are the same as the ones for the exogenously refunded tax found in (23)
and (24), respectively. However, when the firm recognizes that it can influence the size of
the refund, the first-order conditions are
qj =
a  båi 6=j qi   c1   s [#1   #]h
2b  s [#1   #] 1Q
i ,
for j = 1, 2, ...,m1   1,m1,
qj =
a  båi 6=j qi   c0   s [#0   #]h
2b  s [#0   #] 1Q
i ,
for j = m1 + 1,m1 + 2, ..., n  1, n.
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Substituting in the profit-maximizing levels qD1 for the m1 adopters and q
D
0 for the n m1
non-adopters, and suppressing the argument of m1 for clarity, we can write
qD1 =
h
1  sbQD

#0   #D
i 
a  zT1 + s#D

+ [n m1]

zT0   zT1

f
, (25)
qD0 =
h
1  sbQD

#1   #D
i 
a  zT0 + s#D
 m1 zT0   zT1 
f
, (26)
where
f = b [n+ 1] +
1
b

s
QD
2 h
#1   #D
i h
#0   #D
i
  s
QD
hh
#1   #D
i
[n m1 + 1] +
h
#0   #D
i
[m1 + 1]
i
> 0
_m.
Substituting (25) and (26) into PD = a  bQD with QD = m1qD1 + [n m1] qD0 , we get
pD1 =
h
PD   zT1 + s#D
i
qD1 ,
= b

1  s
bQD
h
#1   #D
i h
qD1
i2
.
pD0 =
h
PD   zT0 + s#D
i
qD0 ,
= b

1  s
bQD
h
#0   #D
i h
qD0
i2
.
C Comparison of endogenous versus exogenous refunding
Rewriting the equilibrium conditions (10) for the m1 adopters as
a  bQD(m1)  bqD1 (m1) = c1 + s
h
#1   #D(m1)
i 
1  q
D
1 (m1)
QD

,
and (11) for the n m1 adopters as
a  bQD(m1)  bqD0 (m1) = c0 + s
h
#0   #D(m1)
i 
1  q
D
0 (m1)
QD

,
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we can sum over all n conditions to get
m1
h
a  bQD(m1)  bqD1 (m1)
i
+ [n m1]
h
a  bQD(m1)  bqD0 (m1)
i
= m1

c1 + s
h
#1   #D(m1)
i 
1  q
D
1 (m1)
QD

+ [n m1]

c0 + s
h
#0   #D(m1)
i 
1  q
D
0 (m1)
QD

This simplifies to
na  [n+ 1] bQD(m1) = m1zT1 + [n m1] zT0   ns#D(m1)
  s

m1#1
qD1 (m1)
QD
+ [n m1] #0 q
D
0 (m1)
QD

+ s#D(m1)

m1
qD1 (m1)
QD
+ [n m1] q
D
0 (m1)
QD

yielding
QD(m1) =
na m1zT1   [n m1] zT0 + ns#D(m1)
b [n+ 1]
.
Similarly, using the n equilibrium conditions in (4) and (5), we get
QX(m1) =
na m1zT1   [n m1] zT0 + ns#X(m1)
b [n+ 1]
.
Hence,
QD(m1) QX(m1) =
ns

#D(m1)  #X(m1)

b [n+ 1]
,
The first-order conditions under policy k 2 fT,X,Dg and technology j 2 f0, 1g can also
be written
a  bQk   bqkj = ykj .
where ykj denotes the marginal cost inclusive of the costs of the emissions policy. We drop
the argument of m1 for clarity. We can then write
qkj =
a  ykj
b
 Qk,
with
yTj = z
T
j ,
yXj = cj + s
h
# j   #R
i
,
yDj = cj + s
h
# j   #R
i "
1 
qDj
QD
#
.
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Comparing equilibrium quantities under exogenous and endogenous refunding for adopters,
we can write
qX1   qD1 =
yD1   yX1
b
+QD  QX,
=
c1 + s

#1   #D
 h
1  qD1QD
i
  c1 + s #1   #X
b
+
ns
b [n+ 1]
h
#D   #X
i
,
= s

#D   #1

qD1 [n+ 1] 

#D   #XQD
b [n+ 1]QD
> 0,
since

#D (m1)  #1

>

#D (m1)  #X (m1)

and qD1 (m1) [n+ 1] > Q
D (m1) for 0 < m1 <
n.
Furthermore, for non-adopters, we can write
qX0   qD0 =
yD0   yX0
b
+QD  QX,
=
h
c0 + s

#0   #D
 h
1  qD0QD
ii
  c0 + s #0   #X
b
+
ns
b [n+ 1]
h
#D   #X
i
,
=
 s #0   #D qD0 [n+ 1] + s #X   #DQD
b [n+ 1]QD
.
=
 sm1dsD1 [n+ 1] qD0   s

sX1   sD1

m1dQD
b [n+ 1]QD
.
which implies that qX0 < q
D
0 _sX1  sD1 .
D Optimal adoption times with three technologies
Given an ordering of adoption dates t1  t2  ...  tj  ...  tn for technology 2, where
the first n  k adopters switch from technology 0 and the following k adopters switch from
technology 1, we can write the present value of adopting technology 2 for firm j at tj as
V j2(t1, ..., tj 1, tj, tj+1, ..., tn) =
j 1
å
m2=0
tm2+1Z
tm2
p0(k,m2)e r[ t t2]dt
+
n k
å
m2=j
tm2+1Z
tm2
p2(k,m2)e r[ t t2] dt
+
n
å
m2=n k+1
tm2+1Z
tm2
p2(n m2,m2)e r[ t t2] dt  p2(tj)
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for j = 1, 2, ..., n  k and
V j2(t1, ..., tj 1, tj, tj+1, ..., tn) =
n k 1
å
m2=0
tm2+1Z
tm2
p1(k,m2)e r[ t t2] dt
+
j 1
å
m2=n k
tm2+1Z
tm2
p1(n m2,m2)e r[ t t2] dt
+
n
å
m2=j
tm2+1Z
tm2
p2(n m2,m2)e r[ t t2] dt  p2(tj)
for j = n  k+ 1, n  k+ 2, ..., n  1, n and where t0 = t2 and tn+1 = ¥.
From the assumptions that p2(m1,m2) > p1(m1,m2) > p0(m1,m2)  0, p2(m1,m2 +
1)   p0(m1,m2) > p2(m1   1,m2 + 1)   p1(m1,m2) for all m1,m2 for which m1 + m2 < n
and p002 (t) > re rt (p2(k, 1)  p0(k, 0)) , V j2 is strictly concave in tj for tj 2

tj 1, tj+1

, which
implies that first-order conditions are necessary and sufficient conditions for determining
tj . The first-order conditions are
¶V j2
¶tj
= [p0(k, j  1)  p2(k, j)] e r[ t

j  t2]   p02(tj ) = 0 (27)
for j = 1, 2, ..., n  k and
¶V j2
¶tj
= [p1(n  j+ 1, j  1)  p2(n  j, j)] e r[ t

j  t2]   p02(tj ) = 0 (28)
for j = n  k+ 1, ..., n  1, n.
We now define Dp02,j = p2(k, j)   p0(k, j   1) and Dp12,j = p2(n   j, j)   p1(n   j +
1, j  1) and we can then write (27) and (28) as
¶V j2
¶tj
=  Dp02,je r[ t

j  t2]   p02(tj ) = 0
for j = 1, 2, ..., n  k and
¶V j2
¶tj
=  Dp12,je r[ t

j  t2]   p02(tj ) = 0
for j = n  k+ 1, ..., n  1, n.
From the assumptions that p2(t) < p1(t)ert2 and c2 + s#2 < c1 + s#1, we know that firms
which have not adopted technology 1 by date t2 will not have an incentive to adopt it after
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technology 2 has appeared at t2. Therefore, at t2, the firms only face the decision of when to
adopt technology 2.
For the laggards, the increase in profit rate under the emission tax, DpT02,j, for the firm
which is the jth to adopt technology 2 and switches from technology 0 under a refunded tax,
is given by:
DpT02,j = p
T
2 (k
T, j)  pT0 (kT, j  1) = b
h
qT2 (k
T, j)
i2   b hqT0 (kT, j  1)i2
for j = 1, 2., ..., n  kT   1, n  kT,
and the increase in profit rate under the exogenously refunded tax, DpX02,j, by:
DpX02,j = p
X
2 (k
X, j)  pX0 (kX, j  1)
= b
"
qT2 (k
X, j) +
s#X(kX, j)
b [n+ 1]
#2
  b
"
qT0 (k
X, j  1) + s#
X(kX, j  1)
b [n+ 1]
#2
for j = 1, 2, ..., n  kX   1, n  kX.
The difference in the increase in profit rate from adoption of technology 2 under the
exogenous refunded tax compared to the emission tax for the jth adopter of technology 2,
which would switch from technology 0 under both policies, is thus equal to:
DpX02,j   DpT02,j = b
"
qT2 (k
X, j) +
s#X(kX, j)
b [n+ 1]
#2
  b
"
qT0 (k
X, j  1) + s#
X(kX, j  1)
b [n+ 1]
#2
 

b
h
qT2 (k
T, j)
i2   b hqT0 (kT, j  1)i2 ,
for j = 1, 2, ..., n   kX   1, n   kX. If, as before, we assume that one firm switching from
technology 0 to technology 2 considers its own impact on the refund as negligible, i.e.,
#X(kX, j) = #X(kX, j  1), and use that
qT2 (k
X, j)  qT2 (kT, j) = qT0 (kX, j  1)  qT0 (kT, j  1) =
[kT   kX][zT0   zT2 ]
b[n+ 1]
,
and
qT2 (k
X, j)  qT0 (kX, j  1) = qT2 (kT, j)  qT0 (kT, j  1) =
n

zT0   zT2

b [n+ 1]
,
the difference in profit rate increase for the laggards simplifies to:
DpX02,j   DpT02,j = 2
n

zT0   zT2

b [n+ 1]2
hh
kT   kX
i h
zT0   zT1
i
+ s#X(kX, j)
i
.
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The intermediates exist only if the number of firms which would have adopted tech-
nology 1 by t2 under the emission tax is lower than the number of adopters of technol-
ogy 1 at t2 under the exogenous refunded tax, i.e., kT < kX. The jth adopter, for which
j 2 n  kX + 1, n  kT, would switch from technology 0 under an emission tax, and from
technology 1 under a refunded tax. The difference in adoption time between the policies is
then determined by the following difference:
DpX12,j   DpT02,j = b
"
qT2 (n  j, j) +
s#X(n  j, j)
b [n+ 1]
#2
  b
"
qT1 (n  j+ 1, j  1) +
s#X(n  j+ 1, j  1)
b [n+ 1]
#2
 

b
h
qT2 (k
T, j)
i2   b hqT0 (kT, j  1)i2
Since #X(n  j, j) = #X(n  j+ 1, j  1) from the perspective of the firm, we have
qT2 (n  j, j)  qT1 (n  j+ 1, j  1) =
n

zT1   zT2

b [n+ 1]
qT2 (n  j, j) + qT1 (n  j+ 1, j  1) =
2a  [n  2 [j+ 1]] zT2 + [n  2j] zT1
b [n+ 1]
qT2 (k
T, j) + qT0 (k
T, j  1) = 2a+ [n  2j]

zT0   zT2
  2kT zT0   zT1   2zT2
b [n+ 1]
, so that we can simplify the difference in profit rate increase to
DpX12,j   DpT02,j =
n

zT0   zT1

b [n+ 1]2
h
2kT
h
zT0   zT2
i
  [n  2j]
h
zT0 + z
T
1   2zT2
i
  2
h
a+ zT2
ii
+ 2
n[zT1   zT2 ]
b [n+ 1]2
s#X(n  j, j)
For the early adopters the increase in profit rate from adoption of technology 2 under an
emission tax is
DpT12,j = p
T
2 (n  j, j)  pT1 (n  j+ 1, j  1)
= b

qT2 (n  j, j)2  
h
qT1 (n  j+ 1, j  1)
i2
for j = n  kT + 1, n  kT + 2, ..., n  1, n,
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and under an exogenous refunded tax:
DpX12,j = p
X
2 (n  j, j)  pX1 (n  j+ 1, j  1)
= b
"
qT2 (n  j, j) +
s#X(n  j, j)
b [n+ 1]
#2
  b
"
qT1 (n  j+ 1, j  1) +
s#X(n  j+ 1, j  1)
b [n+ 1]
#2
for j = n  kX + 1, n  kX + 2, ..., n  1, n. Since #X(n  j, j) = #X(n  j+ 1, j  1), the differ-
ence in profit rate increase is given by:
DpX12,j   DpT12,j = 2b
h
qT2 (n  j, j)  qT1 (n  j+ 1, j  1)
i s#X(n  j, j)
b [n+ 1]
for j = n  kT + 1, n  kT + 2, ..., n  1, n.
Using similar tricks as before, this becomes:
DpX12,j   DpT12,j =
2n

zT1   zT2

b [n+ 1]2
s#X(n  j, j)
for j = n  kT + 1, n  kT + 2, ..., n.
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This paper studies how different NOx abatement technologies have diffused under
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time to adoption. The policy, under which the charge revenues are refunded back to the
regulated firms in proportion to energy output, was explicitly designed to affect invest-
ment in NOx-reducing technologies. The results indicate that paying a higher net NOx
charge increases the likelihood of adoption, but only for end-of-pipe post-combustion
technologies. We also find some indication that market power considerations in the heat
and power industry reduce the incentives to abate emissions through investment in post-
combustion technologies. Adoption of post-combustion technologies and the efficiency
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1 Introduction
The long-run impact of emission regulations is mainly determined by the incentives they
provide for innovation and diffusion of more environmentally benign technologies. In Swe-
den, a charge on NOx emissions from large combustion plants was introduced in 1992, as a
complement to the existing system of individual emission standards (SEPA, 2003). The reg-
ulation, under which the charge revenues are refunded back to the regulated firms in pro-
portion to energy output, was explicitly designed to affect technology investment (Sterner
& Turnheim, 2009). Judging from the significant reductions in emission intensities achieved
since the introduction of the policy, this objective would appear to have been reached.
However, changes in emission intensities is the combined result of upfront investments
in abatement technology, fuel switching, and improved knowledge of how to optimize the
combustion process (Ho¨glund-Isaksson & Sterner, 2009). Sterner & Turnheim (2009) sought
to separate reductions in emission intensities at the regulated Swedish plants into contribu-
tions from technology diffusion versus innovation and found both factors very important.
In this paper, we focus on one of these factors: the diffusion process for NOx-reducing tech-
nologies.
Technology diffusion generally follows an S-shaped pattern over time, in which the num-
ber of adopters initially increases slowly until a point in time at which adoption starts to
increase rapidly, followed by a period of leveling off when most potential adopters have
already invested. Early literature such as Griliches (1957) tried to explain this pattern with
epidemic models capturing the spread of knowledge and information about the new tech-
nology (Popp, 2010).
More recent literature has attempted to find mechanisms which explain differences in
preferred dates of adoption among potential adopters. Karshenas & Stoneman (1993) de-
scribed three such mechanisms: rank, stock and order effects. The rank effects results from
the different inherent characteristics of the firms, such as size and industrial sector, which
affects the gains from adoption of the new technology and in turn the preferred adoption
dates. A stock effect is present if the gains of the marginal adopter decreases as the num-
ber of previous adopters increases, e.g., because previous adopters increase their output
and thereby depress industry prices and the return for the next adopter. An order effect is
present if early adopters can achieve a higher return than the late adopters, e.g., because
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the first adopters can preempt the pool of skilled labor. Karshenas & Stoneman (1993) also
developed a decision-theoretical model which they linked to a proportional hazard model
to empirically assess the influence of rank, stock, order and epidemic effects on the pattern
of diffusion.
Popp (2010) used the framework in Karshenas & Stoneman (1993) to analyze adoption
of NOx control technologies at coal-fired power plants in the US. He found that expecta-
tions of future technological advances slow down the diffusion of combustion modification
technologies. Due to the differences in regulation across states, he could also identify envi-
ronmental regulations as the dominating determinants behind adoption of both combustion
as well as post-combustion technologies.
A recent strand of theoretical literature (e.g. Amir et al., 2008; Baker et al., 2008; Bauman
et al., 2008; Calel, 2011) have also highlighted the fact that different types of abatement tech-
nologies have different impacts on the marginal costs of abatement and production. This in
turn implies that adoption incentives provided by environmental regulations differ across
different types of abatement technologies and that the drivers behind the diffusion of these
technologies are likely to be different.
A distinction is often made between end-of-pipe technologies that are add-on measures
that curb emissions after their formation and clean technologies that reduce resource use
and/or pollution at the source (Frondel et al., 2007). Empirically, the drivers for investments
in end-of-pipe versus clean technologies have been explored by Frondel et al. (2007) and
Hammar & Lo¨fgren (2010). The results of Frondel et al. (2007) suggest that regulatory mea-
sures and the stringency of environmental policy are positively correlated with investment
in end-of-pipe technologies while investment in clean technologies seem to be motivated
by market forces and the potential for cost savings. Hammar & Lo¨fgren (2010) found that
the price of energy is an important determinant for investments in end-of-pipe technologies
while internal learning by doing as measured by expenditures on green R&D increase the
probability of investment in clean technologies. Their results also suggested that the two
types of technologies are complementary.
Other studies (e.g. Millock & Nauges, 2006; del Rı´o Gonza´lez, 2005; Pizer et al., 2001)
identify cost savings, industry sector, plant size and financial strength such as self-financing
capacity, profits and resources at the parent company as important determinants for adop-
tion of clean technologies.
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This study contributes to the literature on the drivers of technology diffusion by compar-
ing the determinants of the time to adoption for three types of environmental technologies;
first, technologies which reduce the formation of NOx at combustion; second, end-of-pipe
NOx technologies; and lastly, technologies which improve energy efficiency. We do this for
plants regulated under a particular type of earmarked tax system which redistributes the
emission tax revenues from dirty to clean plants. Moreover, unlike many of the previous
studies analyzing diffusion of abatement technologies, which focus on diffusion within one
industry, we compare environmental technology adoption across different industry sectors.
We analyze the factors that affect the time and decision to invest in NOx abatement tech-
nologies by applying a proportional hazard model. The factors analyzed best explain adop-
tion of end-of-pipe post-combustion technologies. The results suggest that paying a higher
NOx charge net of the refund increases the likelihood of adoption of this type of technology.
We also find indications of economies of scale and that market power considerations in the
heat and power industry reduces the incentives to invest in post-combustion technologies.
Adoption of post-combustion technologies and the efficiency improving technology of flue
gas condensation is also more likely in the heat and power and waste incineration sectors.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the Swedish NOx poli-
cies in more detail and the incentives they provide for the regulated plants. Section 3 gives a
brief overview of different NOx-reducing technologies. Section 4 introduces the theoretical
framework and our empirical model. Section 5 describes the data and explanatory variables
and section 6 the results. Section 7 concludes.
2 NOx policies
This section describes the Swedish NOx policies for large combustion plants in the form of
the refunded NOx charge and individual emission standards. It also describes the incentives
for emission reductions provided under this combination of policies.
2.1 The Swedish NOx charge
The Swedish charge on NOx emissions from large combustion plants was introduced in
1992. At the time, close to 25% of Swedish NOx emissions came from stationary combustion
sources and the charge was seen as a faster and more cost-efficient way of reducing NOx
emissions than the existing system of individual emission standards (SEPA, 2003).
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Because NOx emissions vary significantly with temperature and other combustion pa-
rameters (Sterner & Ho¨glund-Isaksson, 2006), continuous measurement of the flue gas was
required to implement the charge. The installation of the measuring equipment was judged
too costly for smaller plants and the charge therefore only imposed on larger boilers. In
order not to distort competition between larger plants and smaller units not subjected to
the charge, a scheme was designed to refund the charges back to the regulated plants in
proportion to energy output.
Energy output within the NOx charge system is measured in terms of so-called useful
energy, which can be either in the form of electricity, steam or hot water depending on end-
use1. Regulated entities belong to the heat and power sector (between 1992 and 2009 on
average 52% of total useful energy production in the system), the pulp and paper industry
(on average 23% of useful energy production), the waste incineration sector (15%) and the
chemical (5.5%), wood (3.1%), food (1.7%) and metal (1.0%) industries. Initially the charge
only covered boilers and gas turbines with a yearly production of useful energy of at least
50 GWh, but in 1996 the threshold was lowered to 40 GWh and in 1997 further lowered to
25 GWh per year (Ho¨glund-Isaksson & Sterner, 2009).
From 1992 to 2007, the charge was 40 SEK/kg NOx2. In 2008, the charge was raised to 50
SEK/kg NOx following a series of reports from the SEPA which indicated that the impact of
the charge system had diminished over the years (SEPA, 2012). In real terms, the charge had
decreased over time and the increase to 50 SEK in 2008 was in practice a restoration of the
charge to the real level in 1992.
The practical procedure in the NOx system is as follows. At the end of January each year,
the firms declare emissions and production of useful energy at each production unit to the
Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA). At the end of June, SEPA publishes the
net charges to be paid at each facility. For firms paying a positive net charge, payment is
due by October 1, while firms receiving a net refund receive their money, at the latest, two
months later (SEPA, 2004).
1In the heat and power industry, useful energy is most often the amount of energy sold. For other industries,
it is defined as the steam, hot water or electricity produced in a boiler and used in the production process or for
heating of plant facilities (SEPA, 2003).
2Approximately 4e/ kg NOx. NOx is measured in kilograms of NO2. In air, NO is naturally converted
to NO2 and vice versa and the equilibrium ratio of NO to NO2 is determined by atmospheric conditions. A
kilogram of NO is converted into units of kilograms of NO2 by multiplying by the factor 46/30 (the molecular
mass ratio).
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2.2 Individual emission standards
Individual emission standards for NOx emissions from stationary sources were introduced
in 1988 and thuswere already in placewhen the chargeswere introduced (Ho¨glund-Isaksson
& Sterner, 2009). Any quantitative emission limits are determined by county authorities3 and
may vary with industry sector. Emission limits commonly cover nitrogen oxides, carbon
dioxide, carbon monoxide, sulfur, ammonia and particulate matter (SEPA, 2012).
In 2003, the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) conducted an evaluation
of the effect of the emission standards compared to the NOx charge during the period 1997-
20014, finding that emission intensities for boilers not subject to emission restrictions were
higher than for boilers with restrictions. Emission intensities also remained unchanged for
boilers without restrictions during those years. In contrast, emission intensities were 11%
lower in 2001 compared to 1997 for boilers with restrictions. Relevant to note is that boilers
without emission standards often belonged to smaller plants and that fewer boilers in the
wood and pulp and paper industry were subject to restrictions, while restrictions were more
common for boilers in the waste incineration and heat and power sector. Because emissions
were generally much below the quantitative restrictions, the conclusion from SEPA (2003) is
that, for boilers in the heat and power and waste incineration sectors, the NOx charge was
more effective than the restrictions in reducing NOx emissions. Figure 1 illustrates that the
emission standards do not appear to have been the binding factor limiting emissions in 2001
for any of the boilers which were part of the NOx charge system in both 1997 and 2001 and
which were subject to an emission standard in terms of mg NOx per MJ of fuel at the time
when SEPA audited the plant.
Since the SEPA (2003) evaluation, there has been no comprehensive survey of the emis-
sion standards and how they have developed over time. SEPA has supplied us with data
on emission standards in place in 2012 for 42 out of 50 firms in the NOx system, randomly
selected for an interview survey for the SEPA (2012) report. The majority of the quantitative
restrictions were in terms of mg NO2 per MJ of fuel5. Figure 2 illustrates the emission stan-
3They evaluate the plants with respect to the Environmental Code and issue permits which may entail quan-
titative restrictions on emissions of polluting substances.
4SEPA (2003) analyzed 228 boilers (of a total of 448 at the time) that were subject to charges during the period
1997-2001. Among the 228 boilers, 140 were subject to restrictions on NOx emissions. The restrictions were most
often in terms of yearly averages and in units of mg NOx per megajoule (MJ) of fuel but sometimes in other
units, e.g., mg NOx per m3 of fluegas.
5Out of 81 different forms of quantitative restrictions for the boilers at these firms, 52 were in terms of mg
NO2 per MJ of fuel, 25 in terms of mg NO2 per m3 of flue gas or ton of NO2 per year and 4 in terms of mg NO2
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dards for firms in this subsample with an emission standard in equivalent units of mg NOx
per MJ of fuel. In most cases, we do not know in which year the standard came into effect
and for the comparison with actual emissions we therefore illustrate emissions as an aver-
age over the period 1992-2009. Nevertheless, from Figure 2 it appears as if on average the
standard has not been binding over the period. However, we cannot rule out the possibility
that the standard was binding at some point in time.
In the interviews at the surveyed firms, some respondents viewed the standards as a
more important factor than the NOx charge. Respondents also said that the standards made
it more difficult to trade off different emission-reducing measures. The often strong nega-
tive correlation between CO and NOx emissions makes quantitative restrictions on carbon
monoxide especially relevant. It appears that authorities generally have increased the strin-
gency of restrictions on CO since the 1990s, making it more difficult in later years to trade
off NOx emissions for emissions of CO. Unfortunately, we lack data on these CO restric-
tions. Some of the interview respondents also claimed that authorities in some counties issue
more stringent emission standards compared to other counties (SEPA, 2012) - an observation
which we attempt to control for in our estimations.
2.3 Incentives provided by NOx charge and standards
To describe the incentives provided by the NOx charge and the most common form of emis-
sion standard, we consider a firm (with only one boiler for expositional clarity) which faces
a refunded NOx charge at the level of s per unit of emissions. It has a technology k installed
and the cost of generating qi units of useful energy with emission intensity # i is Ci,k(qi, # i) for
firm i. Firm-level emissions is given by ei = # iqi and total emissions from all firms covered
by the NOx charge by E = åi ei. With total production of useful energy Q = åi qi over all
firms and boilers, we define the average emission intensity # = EQ . The firm chooses the level
of useful energy production and emission intensity which minimize the cost of the NOx reg-
ulation and satisfy a minimum level of useful energy, qi, and an emission standard, x i (equal
to infinity in case of the absence of a standard). Since the emission standards are often ex-
pressed in terms of units of emissions per unit of input energy, we write input energy as qiji,k
where ji,k is the energy efficiency of the boiler, and define the standard as a constraint on
per ton of pulp or paper. One heat and power plant and a production line at one waste incineration plant instead
had technology standards mandating SNCR (or equivalent) and SCR, respectively.
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eiji,k
qi
.
In its most intuitive form the cost minimization problem can be written
min
qi ,#i
Ci,k(qi, ei) + sei   sE qiQ (1)
subject to
qi  qi
eiji,k
qi
 x i.
The second term in (1) is the total NOx charge payment for firm i and the third term is
the size of the total refund which is negative and lowers compliance cost. Following Fischer
(2011), we can also write the minimization problem in (1) on a more compact form as
min
qi ,#i
Ci,k(qi, # i) + s [# i   #] qi (2)
subject to
qi  qi (3)
# iji,k  x i. (4)
We will in the following refer to s [# i   #] as the net NOx charge which is in units of SEK per
unit of useful energy. The net NOx charge is positive for a firm with an emission intensity
higher than the average emission intensity #, i.e., # i > #, and negative for a firm with an
emission intensity which is lower than average, i.e., # i < #. That is to say, the refunded NOx
charge serves to raise the average cost of energy production for the firms that are dirtier than
average and lower the average cost for the firms that are cleaner than average.
The two first-order conditions (FOCs) for the cost-minimizing energy production, qi,k,
and emission intensity, #i,k, with technology k are
¶Ci,k(qi,k, #

i,k)
¶qi
+ s

#i,k   #
 
1  q

i,k
Q

= lqi (5)
 ¶Ci,k(q

i,k, #

i,k)
¶# i
1
qi,k
= s

1  q

i,k
Q

+ lx i
ji,k
qi,k
(6)
with the complementary slackness conditions
lqi  0, lqi [qi,k   qi] = 0
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lx i
 0, lx i [#

i,kji,k   x i] = 0.
According to the FOCs, the firm should choose the useful energy production and emission
intensity that makes marginal cost inclusive of the net NOx charge equal to the shadow price
of useful energy (condition (5)). At the same time, it should set the marginal abatement
cost equal to the sum of the NOx charge6 and the shadow price on the emissions constraint
(condition (6)).
It is quite natural to assume that constraint (3) is binding with a shadow price of useful
energy which is larger than zero. In contrast, if a standard is so lax that constraint (4) is not
binding or no standard exists then FOC (6) reduces to
 ¶Ci,k(q

i,k, #

i,k)
¶# i
1
qi,k
= s

1  q

i,k
Q

. (7)
Comparing (6) and (7), we see that if the marginal cost is non-decreasing in the emission
intensity, a firm with a binding individual emission standard (i.e., lx i > 0) should choose a
lower emission intensity than a firm with a comparable boiler without a binding emission
standard (operating at the same level of efficiency and producing the same level of output).
This is to say, a binding standard induces the firm to operate at a marginal cost of abatement
which is higher than the NOx charge.
Note that the annual gains, gi, from adopting a new technology k = 1 when boiler i
already has technology k = 0 installed can be represented as:
gi =
h
Ci,0(qi,0, #

i,0)  Ci,1(qi,1, #i,1)
i
+
h
s

#i,0   #

qi,0   s

#i,1   #

qi,1
i
. (8)
The first term on the right hand side of expression (8) represents the reduction in produc-
tion and abatement costs due to the new technology while the second term represents the
reduction in tax liabilities net of the refund. The extent to which refunding increases adop-
tion gains depends on the average emissions intensity, which is endogenous to the adoption
decisions taken by all firms in the industry.
6The adjustment
h
1  q

i,k
Q
i
in (5) and (6) reflects the fact that a firm with a larger share in total useful energy
qi,k
Q pays a lower effective charge on emissions than a firm with a smaller share. In (5), it also implies that an
above average emitter pays a lower net NOx charge and a below average emitter gets a lower marginal net
subsidy with a larger market share (Fischer, 2011). See Fischer (2011) for more details on the incentives provided
by the refunded charge. In practice, the average boiler share in total useful energy is 0.3% with a maximum of
4.1%. At firm level, the share is on average 2.1%, with a maximum of 11.7%, suggesting that the market share
distortion is perhaps relevant only for the largest heat and power producers.
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3 NOx abatement technologies
As shown by Sterner & Ho¨glund-Isaksson (2006) and demonstrated in the previous sec-
tion, the system of refunded emission charges taxes firms which have higher than average
emission intensities and therefore pay more in charges than they receive in refunds and it
rewards firms which have lower than average emission intensities and receive a net refund.
Therefore, the refunded NOx charge encourages competition among the regulated plants for
the lowest emissions per unit of useful energy. The policy should therefore spur adoption
of technologies which decrease emission intensities. Such technologies include both purely
emission reducing technologies and technologies which improve energy efficiency.
NOx-emission reducing technologies can be divided into combustion and post-combustion
technologies. Combustion technologies are designed to inhibit the formation of NOx in the
combustion stage, e.g., by lowering temperature, controlling air supply or enhancing the
mixing of flue gases. Examples of such technologies installed at the Swedish plants are flue
gas recirculation, ECOTUBE technology, injection technology, low-NOx burner, reburner,
over-fire-air, rotating over-fire-air and ROTAMIX technology (Ho¨glund-Isaksson & Sterner,
2009).
Post-combustion technologies, on the other hand, are end-of-pipe solutions that reduce
NOx in the flue gases after the combustion stage, either through catalytic or non-catalytic
reduction of NOx compounds. Selective catalytic reduction (SCR) uses ammonia or urea
to reduce NOx into water and molecular nitrogen (N2) on catalytic beds at lower tempera-
tures. SCR is highly efficient in reducing NOx emissions but is a large and costly installation.
Selective non-catalytic reduction (SNCR) on the other hand does not require catalysts and
cooling of the flue gases and is therefore less costly but also less efficient (Ho¨glund-Isaksson
& Sterner, 2009). Emission reductions can be as high as 90%with SCR compared to 35%with
SNCR (Linn, 2008).
Flue gas condensation is a technology which improves energy efficiency and has been
adopted by many of the regulated Swedish plants. It recovers heat from the flue gases and
improves energy efficiency without increasing NOx emissions (Ho¨glund-Isaksson & Sterner,
2009). This installation would therefore help to reduce a boiler’s emission intensity and
thereby decrease the firm’s net charge.
One important determinant of adoption is naturally investment cost. The cost of in-
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stalling combustion technologies are highly variable across different boilers. Costs depend
on size, purification requirements, system of injection, type of chemicals used and the com-
plexity of the control system. According to Linn (2008), the total installation cost of a low
NOx burner or a overfire air injector is in the US roughly 10 million USD, although it varies
with boiler characteristics.
Investment costs for the post-combustion technologies SCR and SNCR are also boiler and
plant specific and vary with boiler capacity, among other things (SEPA, 2012). Linn (2008)
also notes that the cost of retrofitting SCR and SNCR varies with plant characteristics but
quotes cost estimates for the US of 40 million USD for SCR as opposed to about 20 USD for
SNCR over the lifetime of the unit.
Moreover, some technologies are not commercially available below certain size thresh-
olds (Sterner & Turnheim, 2009). Technology adoption also depends on access to information
and the degree of involvement in R&D and innovation activities (Sterner & Turnheim, 2009),
which would seem to support the existence of learning effects.
This brief overview illustrates that there is a wide variety of technologies for plant man-
agers to choose from when responding to the NOx regulations. Moreover, because post-
combustion allows firms to choose emissions independently from output to a much larger
extent than the combustion technologies, the adoption of these two types of technologies
might differ in responsiveness to the NOx charge7. In our empirical analysis, we follow Popp
(2010) and group the NOx abatement technologies into two main categories to separately
analyze the determinants of adoption for combustion technologies versus post-combustion
technologies. Additionally, we also analyze investment in flue gas condensation because the
NOx charge system’s focus on emission intensities may have increased the attractiveness of
not only emissions-reducing but also energy efficiency improving technologies.
4 Model of the investment decision
We use the framework in Karshenas & Stoneman (1993) and consider a situation in which a
firm has the choice to install a new technology in a boiler iwhich is included in the refunded
NOx charge system. The cost of doing the installation at time t is I(Zi(t), Li(t), Si(t), t)where
Zi(t) is a vector of boiler-specific characteristics which may affect investment costs. Li(t) is
7Sterner & Turnheim (2009) found that, as expected from their characteristics, SCR followed by SNCR pro-
vided the most significant and sizable reductions in emission intensities.
11
a vector of the number boilers at the plant and firm that unit i belongs to and that may
give rise to internal learning effects which decrease investment costs. Si(t) is the stock of
boilers already installed with the new technology in the industry of unit iwhich could affect
investment costs if there are external learning effects.
By switching to the new technology, the gross profit gain of the boiler in period t increases
by gi(t) = g(Ri(t),Zi(t), Li(t), Si(t), t), where Ri(t) is the NOx charge liabilities for boiler i
in period t before adoption. The net present value of making the investment at time t is
Vi(t) =
¥Z
t
g(Ri(t),Zi(t), Li(t), Si(t), t)e r(t t)dt   I(Zi(t), Li(t), Si(t), t).
Following Karshenas & Stoneman (1993), we specify the conditions which determine
the investment decision: the profitability condition and the arbitrage condition. Clearly, for
adoption to be considered at all, it is necessary that the investment yields positive profits,
i.e.,
Vi(t) > 0. (9)
Furthermore, for it not to be profitable at time t to wait longer to adopt, it is necessary that
yi(t)  d(Vi(t)e
 rt)
dt
 0.
Differentiating with respect to t we get
yi(t) =  g(Ri(t),Zi(t), Li(t), Si(t), t) + rI(Zi(t), Li(t), Si(t), t)  dI(Zi(t), Li(t), Si(t), t)dt  0.
(10)
According to (10), it is not profitable to wait longer to adopt at time t if the profit gains in
period t is larger or equal to the cost of adoption in period t given by the sum of the annuity
of the investment cost and the decrease in investment cost over time.
There are various factors that we cannot observe which also affect the timing and de-
cision to adopt. We therefore introduce the stochastic term # which represents these unob-
served factors. If we assume that # is identically distributed across the firms and over time
with the distribution function F#(e), the condition that it must not be profitable to postpone
adoption to a later date becomes
yi(t) + #  0.
If we also consider the optimal time of adoption for firm i, ti , a random variable with
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distribution function Fi(t), we can write
Fi(t) = Pr fti  tg = Pr f#   yi(t)g = F#( yi(t)) 8 i, t.
To estimate Fi(t), we start from the hazard rate hi(t) =
fi(t)
1 Fi(t) , where fi(t) is the probability
distribution of ti . The hazard rate is defined as the conditional probability of adoption at
time t, given that the firm has not adopted before t8.
As is common in the adoption literature (e.g., Karshenas & Stoneman, 1993; Popp, 2010;
Kerr & Newell, 2003), we estimate a proportional hazard model of the form
hi(t) = l0(t) exp(X0itb),
where l0(t) is the so called baseline hazard and Xit is composed of the vectors Ri(t), Zi(t),
Li(t) and Si(t) which are likely to affect whether the arbitrage condition in (10) is fulfilled.
A variable which negatively affects yi(t) should increase the hazard rate and vice versa.
The baseline hazard l0(t) is common to all units. We estimate semi-parametric Cox pro-
portional hazard models because the Cox model has the advantage that it does not require
any assumptions about the shape of the baseline hazard. The Cox model is estimated using
the method of partial likelihood. A fully parametric proportional hazard model can be more
efficiently estimated by maximum likelihood but is less robust because it entails the risk of
misspecifying the baseline hazard (Cleves et al., 2004).
For simplicity, we have so far only discussed the adoption of a single technology. The
situation we are considering is however one where the plant managers can choose between
three different types of technologies. Similar to Stoneman & Toivanen (1997) who consider
diffusion of multiple technologies, we define gi,k(t) to be the gross profit gain at t from adop-
tion of technology k relative to the no adoption scenario and vi,k(t, tk) to be an additive syn-
ergistic gross profit gain, which is the increase in gross profit at time t from adoption of
technology k at tk (tk  t) relative to the prior technological state9. The total gross profit
gain in time t from adoption of technology k at tk is then given by gi,k(t) + vi,k(t, tk).
We now specify that gi,k(t) is a function of the previously discussed explanatory variables
8The hazard rate is an event rate per unit of time. In the case of technology adoption, a hazard rate might be
intuitively thought of as the number of adopters divided by the number of units that have not still adopted, i.e.,
the survivors, at time t.
9This additive profit gain could e.g. be the additional net decrease in production and regulatory costs from
installing a post-combustion technology when the boiler is already equipped with a combustion technology
relative to when it is not.
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with gi,k(t) = gk(Ri(t),Zi(t), Li,k(t), Si,k(t), t) with Li,k(t) the number of boilers at the plant
and firm with technology k installed and Si,k(t) the number of boilers in the industry of
unit i installed with technology k. Further, we specify vi,k(t, tk) as a function of the prior
technological state Di(tk) at the time of adoption of technology k as well as rank, stock and
learning effects, so that we can write vi,k(t, tk) = v(Di(tk),Zi(t), Li,k(t), Si,k(t)). We can now
specify our technology-specific hazard function as
hi,k(t) = hk(Ri(t),Di(t),Zi(t), Li,k(t), Si,k(t), t). (11)
We separately estimate a proportional hazard model for combustion, post-combustion
and flue gas condensation technology, respectively. We expect the sign on the dummy vari-
ables indicating prior technological state to be positive if the technologies are complements,
and negative if they are substitutes. We would expect the signs on Li,k(t) and Si,k(t) to be
positive if there is internal and external learning (as long as their effect on the rate of decrease
in investment costs is non-positive or not too large) and the sign on Si,k(t) to be negative if
there is an industry stock effect. Expectations on the sign of the coefficients on the boiler-
specific characteristics in Zi(t) and the NOx charge liabilities Ri(t) are discussed in more
detail in the next section.
5 Data and explanatory variables
The data covers the boilers monitored under the Swedish NOx charge system and is a panel
collected over the period 1992-2009 by SEPA. It contains the information on NOx emissions
and production of useful energy necessary to establish the charge liabilities and refunds. It
also includes survey information that covers which technologies are installed at each boiler
as well as information on boiler capacity and the share of different types of fuels in the fuel
mix. There is unfortunately no information on investment costs. Differences in investment
costs are therefore proxied by boiler and firm characteristics.
Our sample consists of 556 boilers for which the information required to estimate at least
one of the three econometric models is available10. Descriptive statistics are presented in
10The number of boilers paying the NOx charge has varied over the years because of the change of the pro-
duction threshold in 1996 and 1997 but also because of entrances of new boilers in other years and the option to
produce below the threshold even though emissions are monitored. 669 boilers paid the charge in at least one
year between 1992 and 2009 with 182 boilers paying the charge in 1992 and 427 boilers in 2009. Out of the 182
boilers in 1992, 19 boilers had at least one of the technologies installed in 1992; 7 had only a post-combustion tech-
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Table 1. As pointed out in section 2, the number of regulated boilers under the NOx scheme
increased in 1996 and 1997. Moreover, new boilers have become part of the scheme over
the period under analysis. Because the boilers which entered later into the system may
be different from the early entrants in their propensity to adopt, we estimate the empirical
model for the full sample and for the subsample of boilers that have been part of the NOx
scheme (and our panel) since 1992 (See Table 6 in the appendix) and compare the results.
5.1 Dependent variables - technology adoption
The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the boiler has the particular
type of technology installed (combustion, post-combustion or flue gas condensation, respec-
tively) and zero otherwise11.
Figure 3 illustrates the diffusion pattern of the three technologies for the boilers in our
sample. There is a sharp increase in the adoption of both combustion and post-combustion
technologies from 1992 to 1993. The decline in the rate of adoption in the years 1995-1997 is
due to the entrance of many smaller units without the technologies installed. The number
of boilers changes each year depending on how many of the boilers paid the NOx charge in
that particular year. For example, in our sample there were 174 boilers paying the charge in
1992 and 400 boilers in 2009. Starting in 1998 there is a steady increase in the share of boilers
with one of the three technologies installed and in 2009 close to 80% of the boilers in our
sample had at least one of the technologies.
5.2 Explanatory variables
Net NOx charge liabilities
From expression (8) it is clear that the NOx charge might affect the incentives to invest in a
nology installed, 3 had only a combustion technology installed, 5 had only condensation technology installed
and 4 boilers had a combination. Since we are using lagged variables to explain adoption and do not have data
before the start of the program in 1992, we cannot include these early adopters in our sample. These boilers are
however included in the sense that they might install another technology in one of the following years. Con-
cerning other boilers excluded from the sample, the boilers not included but paying the charge in at least one
year have on average significantly lower production of useful energy and a significantly lower share of boilers
with any of the technologies installed in any year between 1992 and 2009. These are not surprising results seeing
that a boiler for which information is missing for the estimations is likely to have produced below the threshold
and not been part of the charge and refunding scheme for most of the period. The profitability of installing the
technologies at such boilers which can strategically produce just below the threshold should reasonably be low.
Due to these observable differences, our results are likely not representative for boilers producing around the
production threshold.
11Because we are estimating hazard models, a boiler is only included in the estimation sample as long as it is
at risk of adopting or actually adopts. After the technology is installed, the boiler is dropped from the sample.
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new technology due to reductions in production and abatement costs and net NOx charge
liabilities. Unfortunately, we cannot identify the effect of the stringency of the NOx charge
because there has only been one change to its level (in 2010) since its implementation in
1992. Nevertheless, to account for the effect on production and abatement costs we control
for a series of rank and learning effects that are described later in this section. On the other
hand, as pointed out before, the net reduction of NOx charge liabilities is endogenous to
the adoption decisions taken by all firms in the industry. Thus, to account for the effects of
the NOx charge liabilities we include the variable Net NOx charge levelt-1, which is the net
NOx charge paid at the individual boiler in the previous year denoted s [# i   #] in the cost
function in (2). This proxy is based on the behavioural assumption that the upfront cost of
the NOx charge is a determinant of the adoption decision. Such an assumption finds some
support in Sterner & Turnheim (2009) who suggest that the refunding systems reporting and
yearly publication of individual emission intensities and net payments probably acts as an
additional incentive for firms to compete for emission-reducing measures.
The intuition behind our proxy is that that being a net payer within the refunding system
stimulates adoption of emission-reducing technologies due to a greater expected reduction
in NOx payments.
As discussed in section 2.3, a confounding factor is the emission standards issued for
some of the boilers by county authorities. Unfortunately, we only have information about
the emission standards for a small randomly selected subsample of 42 firms. Anecdotal
evidence tells us that some county authorities apply more stringent standards than others.
To try to capture some of the difference in regulatory stringency across regions, we use the
county location of the boilers for which we know the emission standard to construct county
average standards. We use these averages to divide the counties into two halves: one with
relatively more stringent standards, and one with relatively lax standards and estimate our
model separately for the two groups.
Technology substitutes or complements
To analyze how the prior technological state affects the investment decision, we include
dummy variables indicating whether the boiler was already equipped with the other two
types of technologies in the previous year, Combustion tech.t-1, Post-comb. tech.t-1 and Flue gas
cond. tech.t-1, respectively. If the technologies are substitutes, we would expect a negative
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sign, while we would expect a positive sign if they are complements. We lag these variables
to avoid the issue of simultaneity in the investment decision across the three technologies.
Biofuel use
On the one hand, biofuel use releases high levels of NOx emissions relative to coal and
gas, which might lead to earlier adoption of NOx abatement technologies. On the other
hand, biofuel use might entail a lower cost as it is exempted from the Swedish CO2 tax and
other regulations (Bra¨nnlund & Kristro¨m, 2001). To capture these dimensions, we include
a measure of relative expected cost of burning biofuels compared to other fuels, Bio/fossil
fuel costt+1. In calculating this ratio, the numerator is computed as the product of the biofuel
share in the total fuel mix in time t and the price of biofuel in t+ 1. The denominator is the
product of the fuel shares for other fuels (oil, gas, coal, peat and waste) in t and their respec-
tive pre-carbon tax price in t+ 1 plus the total CO2 cost of these fuels. The forwarded prices
are used as proxies of the expected prices. We employed the price of forest fuels (skogsflis) as
the price of biofuels, the price of EO1 oil as the oil price, and the gate fees for burning waste
as the price for waste12. Regarding the CO2 fuel costs, climate policy in Sweden includes
a carbon tax and the price of carbon allowances in the European Union Emission Trading
Scheme (EU ETS). We calculate CO2 fuel costs at the boiler level considering the CO2 emis-
sions of the fuel mix and the differences in the carbon tax that apply to different sectors13.
Entry effects
We include the indicator variables Entrant 1996-1997 and Entrant 1998-2009, which are equal
to one if the boiler entered the NOx charge system in those years, and zero otherwise. Be-
cause Capacity is already controlling for differences in size between earlier and later entrants,
Entrant 1996-1997 and Entrant 1998-2009 should be capturing any other potential effect of
12These are yearly market and forecasted fees obtained from interviews conducted by Projektinriktad forskn-
ing och utveckling of representatives of several waste incineration plants (see Profu (2011)). A heating value
of 2.8 o¨re/kWh (approximately 0.3 e-cents/kWh) is used to express the fees in the same units of the other fuel
prices.
13For CO2 emission factors see SEPA (2009). The carbon tax is based on the carbon content of the fuel; a
number of deductions and exemptions from the carbon tax have been introduced in different sectors, and this
also varies according to the type of generation in the case of the heat and power sector. Additionally, not all
the plants are part of the EU ETS system and the overlapping process with the carbon tax has added other
tax exemptions for the plants within the EU ETS. The EU ETS CO2 price employed to compute the CO2 fuel
costs is the yearly average spot price. We also tried including the sector-specific prices of CO2 separately as an
explanatory variable but this was not significant. Furthermore, considering potential reverse causality for the
use of biofuels, results remained largely unchanged when lagging the relative biofuel to fossil fuel cost.
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late entry into the system on the profitability of adopting cleaner technologies, such as lower
investment cost or the redistribution of charge revenues that might have occurred when
smaller and dirtier than average units entered and increased charge revenues in 1996 and
1997.
Rank effects
With respect to rank effects, i.e., inherent characteristics of the firm and boiler which may
affect adoption, we consider industry sector and boiler capacity. Firms in different industry
sectors face different economic conditions and levels of competition which may affect the
propensity and ability to adopt new technologies. The NOx charge may also affect the heat
and power industry differently than the other sectors since useful energy as it is defined is
the end product of the heat and power sector but mainly an intermediate input for the other
industries.
There are also some indications from SEPA (2003) that the stringency of quantitative
restrictions may vary between industry sectors, with the heat and power sector and waste
incineration possibly being subject to more stringent regulation. We include the dummy
variables Pulp-paper sector and Waste incineration and, due to the relatively small sample of
boilers in the remaining industries, a common dummy, Other sectors, for the food, chemical,
wood and metal industries. We use heat and power as our reference sector, because this is
the dominant sector in the NOx system.
Boiler capacity, Capacity, is expected to increase the benefits of adoption and possibly
also lower the cost of adoption through economies of scale, at least for the post-combustion
technologies.
Stock effects or external learning
To test for a potential stock or external learning effect, we further include the total number
of boilers in the industry sector that had the technology installed in the previous year, Sector
comb.t-1, Sector post-comb.t-1 and Sector flue gas.t-1, respectively. If there are learning effects, we
would expect benefits to increase and/or the cost of adoption to decrease with a larger stock
of boilers installed with the technology. In contrast, if there is a stock effect, the benefit of
adoption would decrease with the stock of boilers in the industry already equipped with the
technology.
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Internal learning
We also include a measure of plant and firm experience with the relevant technology, indi-
cated by the number of boilers at the plant and firm that had the technology installed in the
previous year, Plant comb.t-1, Plant post-comb.t-1 and Plant flue gas.t-1 and Firm comb.t-1, Firm
post-comb.t-1 and Firm flue gas.t-1, respectively. We would also expect more boilers at the plant
and firm equipped with the new technology to possibly decrease the cost of adoption. We
lack information on the financial situation of the firms which the boilers belong to, but pre-
vious investments at the plant or firm may also proxy for greater financial strength. We lag
these variables as well to avoid the issue of simultaneity in the investment decision at plant
and firm level.
6 Econometric results
In this section we present the results of the Cox proportional hazard model for the adoption
of combustion, post-combustion and flue gas condensation technologies (see Tables 2, 3 and
4, respectively). We conducted the regressions for different subsamples to analyze how the
drivers of adoption differ across sectors and counties with standards of different stringency.
Thus, in Tables 2, 3, and 4, column (1) shows the estimates for the pooled sample, column
(2) for the heat and power sector, column (3) for boilers in non-heat and power sectors, and
columns (4) and (5) for counties with indications of stringent and lax emission intensity
standards, respectively.
As robustness checks, we also estimated the regressions using the Weibull parametric
proportional hazard model. Although the Weibull model is more restrictive than the Cox
model because it assumes a monotonic function of time of the baseline hazard, it can tell
us about the sensitivity of our estimates to changes in the specification. The results for the
Weibull regression are presented in the Appendix in Table 5.
All the tables present the estimated coefficients and therefore their sign is indicative of
whether an explanatory variable speeds up or retard the adoption decision. Given the non-
linearity of the hazard function and to ease interpretation of the magnitude of these coeffi-
cients throughout the text, the effect of a covariate on the conditional probability of adopting
is calculated as exp(b), i.e., as the hazard ratio. In that manner, exponentiated coefficients
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larger than one imply that the covariate increases the hazard of adoption, whereas values
lower than one mean that it decreases the hazard. For example, a hazard ratio of 1.02 indi-
cates that a one unit increase in the explanatory variable increases the hazard of adopting the
technology by 2%. This effect is interpreted as a proportional shift of the hazard rate relative
to the baseline, all other things equal. Likewise, if a hazard ratio is equal to 3, this would
imply that boilers in the analysis group (e.g., belonging to a particular sector) are three times
more likely to adopt compared to the reference group. In this case, it is usual to say that the
likelihood of adoption increases by a factor of 3.
6.1 Adoption of combustion technologies
The estimated proportional hazard models explaining the diffusion pattern of combustion
technologies are in Table 2. Overall, we identify few of the drivers behind the adoption of
this group of technologies.
The net charge liabilites in terms of Net NOx charge levelt-1 does not influence the haz-
ard of adoption. Although we found a positive coefficient of the net charge for the pooled
sample, the heat and power sector, and the counties with stringent emission intensity stan-
dards, the effect of the net NOx charge is not statistically significantly different from zero at
conventional levels across all subsamples.
The results in general show a low explanatory power also for the other covariates across
subsamples. Few of the variables are statistically significant. In the pooled regression, the
only variable that plays a role in the adoption decision is Entrant 1998-2009. The hazard
of adopting the technology for those boilers that entered the program in that period is 66%
higher than the hazard of the boilers that entered in 1992-1995. This variable is also statis-
tically significant and positive for the heat and power sector, but statistically insignificant
for the rest of the subsamples. Entry effects may have been more important for the heat
and power sector since NOx-reducing measures may have greater priority in that sector. For
these potentially relatively new boilers, the cost of installation may be lower, leading them
to adopt soon after entry into the system.
The conditional probability of adopting combustion technologies seems to be indepen-
dent of installing the most expensive type of technology in the previous year, Post-comb.t-1.
Having flue gas condensation installed appears to influence the likelihood of adoption in
the heat and power sector. A boiler in the heat and power sector with flue gas condensa-
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tion already installed has a 60% higher hazard of adopting a combustion technology. This
result is mainly present when the combustion technology is flue gas recirculation, indicating
complementarity of these two particular types of technologies.
Although there seems not to be any statistical difference in the sector dummies for the
pooled model and the counties with stringent standards, boilers belonging to the pulp and
paper sector within the counties with lax standards were less likely to adopt than boilers in
the heat and power sector. This result indicates that boilers in the pulp and paper industry
are relatively less prone to adoption unless induced to invest in NOx-reducing measures by
stringent emission standards.
Bio/fossil fuel costt+1, Capacity, and Sector comb.t-1 do not appear to play a role in induc-
ing adoption of combustion technology. We might have expected a positive and significant
coefficient of the relative fuel cost if investment in NOx-reducing technologies should be
more profitable for a boiler which uses more biofuel. However, our price variable does not
capture individual agreements between firms and fuel suppliers regarding fuel prices. For
instance, the presence of middle-term contracts could make firms less responsive to changes
in the prices in the next year. Regarding the insignificant coefficient for Capacity, a potential
explanation is that combustion technologies are installed at a relative low cost and a viable
alternative also at smaller boilers.
As expected, internal learning increases adoption; however these effects are only sta-
tistically significant for Plant comb.t-1 in the non-heat and power sectors regression and in
counties estimated to have lax emission intensity standards. For instance, in the counties
with lax standards, having one additional boiler within the same plant already equipped
with a combustion technology increases the likelihood of adoption of another boiler in that
plant by 50%. Neither stock effects nor external learning were observed in our estimation of
combustion technologies.
Our results for the general model are qualitatively similar when we estimate the regres-
sions using a Weibull parametric model. An important difference with the estimates in the
Cox model is that Sector flue gas. t-1 is statistically significant at 1% level, suggesting the pres-
ence of stock effects. Moreover, there seem to be differences across sectors in the hazard of
adopting combustion technologies.
Statistical testing indicates that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the Weibull shape
parameter is equal to one at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, implying that the base-
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line hazard is constant over time. This result is also consistent with Popp (2010)’s argument
that unmeasured learning effects are small because the technologies have been well known
for a long time. Our results also remain largely unchanged when we study the subsample of
boilers who have been part of the NOx scheme since 1992 (see Appendix Table 6).
6.2 Adoption of post-combustion technologies
The estimated proportional hazardmodels explaining the diffusion of post-combustion tech-
nologies are presented in Table 3. Compared to combustion technologies, the covariates for
post-combustion technologies have better explanatory power. The results indicate that the
Net NOx charge levelt-1 is one factor encouraging the adoption of post-combustion technolo-
gies. The effect of the net charge is statistically significantly different from zero either at the
5% or 10% level across specifications, except for the subsample of boilers within counties
with lax emission intensity standards. The effect is relatively higher for boilers in the heat
and power sector. An increase of 10 SEK/MWh of the net NOx charge raises the hazard of
adoption by 44%-98%, other things equal.
It appears that the significant coefficient for the net NOx charge is driven by adoption
in the counties estimated to have stringent standards, possibly explained by the net charge
level being more negatively correlated with the likelihood of being subject to a binding stan-
dard in the pooled sample. Nevertheless, since we cannot fully control for the individual
stringency of the standard nor the year of implementation, we cannot rule out that a boiler
being more dirty than average may also be more likely to become subjected to an emission
standard.
Whether the boiler has combustion or flue gas condensation technology already installed
has no statistically significant effect in the pooled and sector subsamples. However, there are
some differences in the effect of these technologies when classifying counties by stringency
of standards. The effect of a combustion technology installed in the previous year, Comb.t-1,
is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level in counties with lax standards. In those
counties, a combustion technology already installed increases the hazard of adopting by a
factor of 2.1. Although combustion technologies seem to be independent of the adoption
decision of post-combustion technologies in counties with stringent standards, in counties
with lax standards the low cost investments of NOx reducing technologies appear to have
been first exhausted before plants moved to more expensive abatement investments.
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In the case of flue gas condensation technology, Flue gas cond.t-1 is statistically signifi-
cant in counties with stringent standards. Installing this technology in the previous year
raises the hazard of adopting post-combustion technology by a factor of 3.6. Therefore, com-
plementarities between technologies seem to be associated more with the stringency of the
emission standards: post-combustion and combustion technology in counties with lax stan-
dards, and post-combustion and flue gas condensation technology in counties with stringent
standards. Unfortunately, we do not have the information on individual emission standards
at the boiler level to properly control for this.
As expected, boiler capacity, Capacity has a significant and positive effect on the condi-
tional probability of adoption in most of the subsamples. A 10 MW increase in the boiler
capacity increases the hazard by 2.2%-4.6%, which is consistent with the economies of scale
related to SCR and SNCR technologies.
A boiler belonging to the Waste incineration sector is more likely to be equipped with a
post-combustion technology than a boiler in the heat and power industry (see columns 1
and 5), while boilers in Other sectors such as the wood, metal food, and chemical sectors are
significantly less likely to be equipped with a post-combustion technology (see columns 1
and 4). That waste incineration boilers are more likely to be equipped with post-combustion
technologies could possibly be explained by the ownership structure of this sector. Waste
incineration boilers often belong to public utilities which may have motives other than pure
profitability for investing in emission reducing technologies.
Just as in the combustion technology regressions, the expected relative cost of burning
biofuels Bio/fossil fuel costt+1 is also not statistically significant in the post-combustion tech-
nology estimations. There are no robust indications of a general stock or external learning
effect across the subsamples. Nevertheless, in counties with stringent emission intensity
standards there is some indication of a stock effect.
Consistent with expectations, boilers in the heat and power sector and in counties with
stringent standards that entered in the period 1996-1997 were less likely to adopt than boilers
entering in 1992-1995. Internal learning seems to have been a relevant factor explaining the
conditional likelihood of adoption. The variable Plant post-comb.t-1 was positive and statisti-
cally significant in most of the subsamples, while Firm post-comb.t-1 was negative and statisti-
cally significant in only two of them. The highest internal learning effect of Plant post-comb.t-1
is present in the heat and power sector. The decreased hazard induced by Firm post-comb.t-1
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may indicate that internal learning is counteracted by financial constraints. Alternatively,
as shown by Fischer (2011), firms with market power that are cleaner than average have an
incentive to abate less since the market share adjustment in (6) implies that a larger firm has
a lower marginal cost of emissions.
Our results appear not to be very sensitive when we estimate the Weibull parametric
model and when the sample is restricted to the boilers that have been in the the NOx charge
system since 1992 (see Appendix Table 6). The net NOx charge is consistently positive and
statistically significant at the 5% significance level. The magnitude of the effect of an increase
in the net NOx charge is roughly similar to that found in the pooled sample for the Coxmodel
and our results seem robust to changes in the specification of the baseline hazard. We cannot
reject the hypothesis at the 1% significance level that the baseline hazard is constant over
time. As mentioned earlier, this also supports the idea that the unmeasured learning effects
are not significant.
For the entrant boilers in 1992, the effect of the net charge is much larger than in the
general Cox model. An increase of 10 SEK/MWh in the net NOx charge increases the hazard
rate by 78%. Interestingly, after controlling for boiler capacity, these boilers tend to be more
responsive to the net charge. The fact that they have faced the regulation for a longer time
than other boilers might be an explanation of this result.
6.3 Adoption of flue gas condensation technology
The models explaining diffusion of flue gas condensation technologies are found in Table 4.
The Net NOx charge levelt-1 has no statistically significant effect in either specification. This
indicates that the net NOx charge liability is not a major driver for investments in flue gas
condensation technology.
Having a post-combustion technology already installed has a positive but non-significant
effect for the pooled sample. However, the sign of Post-comb. tech.t-1 is positive and signifi-
cant for the heat and power sector and for the non-heat and power sectors when estimated
separately in specification (2) and (3), indicating that the two technologies are somehow com-
plementary. This may also be an indicator for boilers belonging to less capital constrained
firms. Post-comb. tech.t-1 also has a large positive and significant effect for boilers in coun-
ties with indications of more stringent emission standards but not for boilers in the counties
indicated to have more lax standards. One possible explanation to this result could be that
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already being equipped with a post-combustion technology in the stringent counties is an
indicator of being subject to a relatively more stringent individual standard, which further
raises the incentives to become more energy efficient.
Having a combustion technology installed has a positive but non-significant effect for
both the pooled sample and the subsamples, but it is only significant for the sample of non-
heat and power sectors. Among the non-heat and power sectors, it appears that having
either of the two other technologies already installed significantly increases the likelihood of
also investing in flue gas condensation.
Bio/fossil fuel costt+1 is significant but only weakly so at the 10% level in the pooled sam-
ple. Generally, since flue gas condensation can greatly improve heat output, a positive effect
could have been expected, but it is not consistently supported across subsamples. For Capac-
ity, it seems that, at least in the non-heat and power sectors, smaller boilers are more likely
to adopt flue gas condensation. This is also true for boilers in the counties with indications
of more stringent emission standards.
Boilers in the Waste incineration sector do not significantly differ from boilers in the heat
and power sector in their likelihood of being equipped with flue gas condensation technol-
ogy. However, boilers in the Pulp-paper sector and other non-heat and powers sectors are
significantly less likely to be installed with flue gas condensation technology than a boiler in
the heat and power sector. Belonging to the Pulp-paper sector in the pooled sample on aver-
age reduces the hazard of adoption by 79% while belonging to the Other sectors reduces the
hazard by 88%.
Entrant 1996-1997 has a consistently negative effect which is significant both in the pooled
sample and the non-heat and power sector. It is also significant for the boilers in the counties
with stringent standards. This is an indication of an entry effect in the sense that the prof-
itability of investing in flue gas condensation appears to be larger for boilers entering the
system before 1996. However, the negative coefficient on Entrant 1998-2009 is not significant
in either specification, not supporting a general negative effect of late entry.
The negative sign on Sector flue gas.t-1 is consistent with a stock effect but it is very small
even in the pooled sample where it is significant. One more boiler in the same sector with
flue gas condensation installedwould reduce the hazard of adoption by 1.3%. When it comes
to the internal learning variables, Plant flue gas.t-1 is only positive for the non-heat and power
sample in (3) and Firm flue gas.t-1 only positive and significant in (5), not really supporting
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the existence of any general internal learning effects.
Comparing the results for the pooled sample in (1) with results for the parametric es-
timation in the Appendix Table 5, there are just slight differences in the magnitude of the
coefficients but signs remain the same. This seems to indicate that a Weibull distributed
baseline hazard is not an unreasonable assumption. The Weibull shape parameter is signif-
icantly larger than 1, indicating a baseline hazard which increases over time. Generally, the
level of significance of the coefficients increases with the Weibull specification which reflects
the fact that a fully parametric estimation tend to be more efficient.
Looking at the separate estimation in the Appendix Table 6 for the boilers that entered
the NOx charge system in 1992, we note that results are different for specification (1) in Table
4. For this sample of boilers, the Net NOx charge levelt-1 has a weakly significant negative
effect while the effect of having a post-combustion technology installed in the previous year
is significant and increases the hazard of adoption. Further exploring this result, it appears
that the significantly negative effect of the Net NOx charge levelt-1 only exists for the subsam-
ple of boilers that had a post-combustion technology installed in any previous year. Given
that a boiler has a post-combustion technology, it appears that it is actually more likely to
be equipped with flue gas condensation technology the cleaner it already is (as indicated
by the negative sign). Possibly non-observed individual emission standards could be an ex-
planation if, among the boilers with a post-combustion technology that entered the system
in 1992, the ones that produced with a lower emission intensity also were subject to a more
stringent individual standard that raised the incentives to adopt also flue gas condensation
technology.
7 Conclusions
The refunded emission payment scheme has been in place in Sweden since 1992 to reduce
NOx emissions from large combustion plants. Previous studies have shown that the charge
induced a sizable reduction in emission intensities in the early years of implementation. In
this paper, we investigate the factors affecting the decision to invest in NOx-reducing and
energy efficiency improving technologies.
We primarily find results on drivers behind the adoption of post-combustion technolo-
gies. Because the NOx charge scheme, on the net, only taxes the firms which are dirtier
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than average, we tested the hypothesis that the net charge liabilities stimulates adoption.
However, the net NOx charge per unit of energy did not seem to encourage adoption of
combustion or flue gas condensation technologies. The net NOx charge only plays a role in
stimulating adoption of the most expensive technologies: post-combustion installations. Be-
cause these types of technologies can be characterized as end-of-pipe solutions which allow
firms to choose emissions independently from output to a much larger extent than the other
technologies, this result is possibly simply driven by larger potential gains for boilers with
initially higher emission levels.
Adoption of post-combustion technologies is also more likely in the waste incineration
sector and adoption of the efficiency improving technology of flue gas condensation more
likely in both the waste incineration and heat and power sectors. This can possibly be ex-
plained by a comparatively large degree of public ownership in these two sectors.
The capacity of the boiler increases the likelihood of adoption of post-combustion tech-
nologies in linewith the expected economies of scale. There are also indications of an internal
learning effect such that more boilers already installed with post-combustion technologies
at the plant increases the likelihood of adoption. In contrast, in the heat and power industry,
more boilers at the next step of aggregation, the firm, makes adoption less likely. A potential
explanation is that firms with a large share of the useful energy output in the refunding sys-
tem has reduced incentives to abate emissions because of the negative effect of abatement
on the size of the refund.
The Swedish NOx charge and refunding scheme is complex, as are the causalities and
timing involved, and this topic would benefit from a more detailed future study of the dy-
namics of plant regulations if more data becomes available. Disentangling the incentives for
investment in different types of environmental technologies provided by this scheme is also
a potential area for future research.
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Figure 1: Emission standards and actual emissions (in terms of mg NOx per MJ of fuel) in
2001 for boilers which were in the NOx charge system in both 1997 and 2001 (SEPA, 2003).
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Figure 2: Emission standards and actual emissions (average over 1992-2009) for boilers
which were randomly sampled for the SEPA(2012) report and also subject to emission stan-
dards in terms of mg NOx per MJ of fuel. Data supplied by SEPA. Averages at plant level.
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Figure 3: Diffusion of post-combustion, combustion and flue gas condensation technology
among the boilers in the joint sample for all three proportional hazard models.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Combustion tech. 0.45 0.5 0 1 5343
Post-comb. tech. 0.32 0.47 0 1 5343
Flue gas cond. tech. 0.29 0.45 0 1 5343
Plant comb.t 1 0.9 1.09 0 4 5343
Firm comb.t 1 3.26 4.81 0 21 5343
Sector comb.t 1 50.2 39.09 0 137 5343
Plant post-comb.t 1 0.68 1.08 0 5 5343
Firm post-comb.t 1 2.26 3.51 0 14 5343
Sector post-comb.t 1 33.12 24.72 0 87 5343
Plant flue gas.t 1 0.53 0.9 0 5 5343
Firm flue gas.t 1 1.91 3.41 0 16 5343
Sector flue gas.t 1 37.42 39.5 0 114 5343
Net NOx charge levelt 1 0.16 0.55 -1.27 4.51 5343
Bio/fossil fuel costt+1 1.21 1.55 0 7.82 5291
Capacity 49.251 81.799 4 825 556
Heat-power sector 0.5 0.5 0 1 556
Pulp-paper sector 0.153 0.36 0 1 556
Waste incineration 0.115 0.319 0 1 556
Wood industry 0.106 0.308 0 1 556
Chemical industry 0.072 0.259 0 1 556
Food industry 0.041 0.199 0 1 556
Metal industry 0.013 0.112 0 1 556
Entrant 1996-1997 0.243 0.429 0 1 556
Entrant 1998-2009 0.372 0.484 0 1 556
Notes: Net NOx charge level is in units of 10 SEK per MWh of useful energy (real values with reference year 1992). Capacity
in units of 10 MW. Bio/fossil fuel cost is a relative cost in units of 10. Plant post-comb.t-1, Plant comb.t-1, Plant flue gas.t-1, Firm
post-comb.t-1, Firm comb.t-1, Firm flue gas.t-1, Sector post-comb.t-1, Sector comb.t-1 and Sector flue gas.t-1 are in units of number of
boilers. All other variables are dummy variables.
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Table 2: Adoption of combustion technologies.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable Pooled Heat & Power Non-Heat Stringent Lax
& Power counties counties
Net NOx charge levelt 1 0.042 0.284 -0.089 0.128 -0.124
(0.135) (0.214) (0.153) (0.178) (0.160)
Post-comb. tech.t 1 -0.013 0.060 0.100 -0.429 0.289
(0.229) (0.316) (0.281) (0.291) (0.323)
Flue gas cond. tech.t 1 0.316 0.482** 0.089 0.315 0.280
(0.195) (0.226) (0.392) (0.240) (0.341)
Capacity -0.007 0.002 -0.049 0.010 -0.016
(0.012) (0.010) (0.031) (0.015) (0.018)
Entrant 1996-1997 0.142 0.228 0.031 -0.134 0.498
(0.229) (0.369) (0.303) (0.331) (0.342)
Entrant 1998-2009 0.505* 0.714* 0.228 0.558 0.363
(0.294) (0.423) (0.386) (0.401) (0.395)
Bio/fossil fuel costt+1 -0.007 0.029 -0.021 -0.002 -0.008
(0.050) (0.077) (0.066) (0.079) (0.075)
Plant comb.t 1 0.181 0.089 0.301* 0.010 0.440***
(0.143) (0.210) (0.170) (0.167) (0.158)
Firm comb.t 1 0.022 0.029 0.019 0.024 0.027
(0.015) (0.024) (0.031) (0.019) (0.022)
Sector comb.t 1 -0.007 - - -0.003 -0.011
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008)
Pulp-paper sector -0.427 - - 0.112 -0.895**
(0.283) (0.396) (0.435)
Waste incineration -0.367 - - -0.041 -0.652
(0.309) (0.438) (0.437)
Other sectors -0.544 - - -0.107 -0.986
(0.384) (0.455) (0.724)
Observations 3016 1324 1692 1702 1314
No. of subjects 464 221 243 269 195
No. of failures 194 88 106 108 86
Log likelihood -987.64 -370.61 -481.45 -489.06 -357.25
Chi-squared 21.08 16.36 7.89 14.43 40.45
P-value 0.07 0.06 0.55 0.34 0.00
Notes: This table shows the coefficients of the Cox proportional hazard model from five sub-samples for the period 1992-
2009. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the boiler has a combustion technology installed;
zero otherwise. Continuous variables are in units of 10. (1) General model for the pooled sample with sector dummies.
The variable ”Other sectors” is a dummy variable for boilers in the wood, metal, food, and chemical industries, while
the reference group is heat & power sector. (2) Estimates for heat and power sector, (3) estimates for other sectors,
(4) estimates for counties with stringent emission intensity standards, and (5) estimates for counties with lax emission
intensity standards. Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary correlation within
firm-level clusters. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3: Adoption of postcombustion technologies.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable Pooled Heat & Power Non-Heat Stringent Lax
& Power counties counties
Net NOx charge levelt 1 0.367*** 0.685** 0.491*** 0.631*** -0.013
(0.126) (0.290) (0.108) (0.171) (0.162)
Combustion tech.t 1 0.249 0.253 0.388 -0.336 0.729**
(0.272) (0.408) (0.331) (0.519) (0.300)
Flue gas cond. tech.t 1 0.313 0.450 0.502 1.278*** -0.680
(0.360) (0.403) (0.603) (0.479) (0.517)
Capacity 0.023*** 0.022** 0.045** 0.007 0.026***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.020) (0.018) (0.007)
Entrant 1996-1997 -0.298 -1.410** -0.182 -2.542** 0.223
(0.427) (0.665) (0.471) (1.171) (0.514)
Entrant 1998-2009 0.301 -0.670 0.773 -0.339 0.617
(0.386) (0.513) (0.514) (0.557) (0.603)
Bio/fossil fuel costt+1 -0.017 0.046 -0.115 0.107 -0.173
(0.085) (0.114) (0.114) (0.099) (0.137)
Plant post-comb.t 1 0.355** 0.938*** 0.247 0.440* 0.731***
(0.172) (0.210) (0.159) (0.242) (0.223)
Firm post-comb.t 1 -0.060 -0.195*** 0.072 -0.120** 0.032
(0.037) (0.047) (0.048) (0.061) (0.041)
Sector post-comb.t 1 -0.015 - - -0.032* 0.007
(0.014) (0.019) (0.020)
Pulp-paper sector -0.085 - - -0.188 -0.043
(0.360) (0.505) (0.500)
Waste incineration 1.001*** - - 0.777 1.205***
(0.330) (0.555) (0.344)
Other sectors -1.719*** - - -1.885*** -1.364
(0.629) (0.688) (1.141)
Observations 3680 1744 1936 2113 1567
No. of subjects 484 237 247 275 209
No. of failures 110 44 66 47 63
Log likelihood -533.86 -179.12 -292.51 -192.38 -248.41
Chi-squared 139.05 38.68 63.83 109.59 96.81
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: This table shows the coefficients of the Cox proportional hazard model from five sub-samples for the period 1992-
2009. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the boiler has a post-combustion technology installed;
zero otherwise. Continuous variables are in units of 10. (1) General model for the pooled sample with sector dummies.
The variable ”Other sectors” is a dummy variable for boilers in the wood, metal, food, and chemical industries, while
the reference group is heat & power sector. (2) Estimates for heat and power sector, (3) estimates for other sectors, (4)
estimates for counties with stringent emission intensity standards, and (5) estimates for counties with lax emission intensity
standards. Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary correlation within firm-level
clusters. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 4: Adoption of flue gas condensation technology.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable Pooled Heat & Power Non-Heat Stringent Lax
& Power counties counties
Net NOx charge levelt 1 -0.304 0.011 -0.380 -0.613 -0.170
(0.304) (0.441) (0.434) (0.459) (0.456)
Post-comb. tech.t 1 0.394 0.559* 1.302*** 1.117*** -0.836
(0.263) (0.335) (0.335) (0.276) (0.667)
Combustion tech.t 1 0.297 0.083 0.726** 0.081 0.293
(0.219) (0.297) (0.303) (0.380) (0.412)
Capacity -0.043 -0.055 -0.090* -0.083*** -0.003
(0.029) (0.042) (0.050) (0.025) (0.027)
Entrant 1996-1997 -0.786** -0.810 -1.046** -2.162** -0.672
(0.348) (0.537) (0.502) (0.905) (0.461)
Entrant 1998-2009 -0.308 -0.121 -0.759 -0.552 -0.463
(0.400) (0.547) (0.584) (0.534) (0.836)
Bio/fossil fuel costt+1 0.128* 0.012 0.166 -0.046 0.206
(0.065) (0.080) (0.103) (0.079) (0.135)
Plant flue gas.t 1 -0.157 -0.526 0.471** -0.017 -0.317
(0.250) (0.733) (0.238) (0.230) (0.494)
Firm flue gas.t 1 0.038 0.045 0.025 0.027 0.081*
(0.026) (0.039) (0.029) (0.037) (0.042)
Sector flue gas.t 1 -0.013* - - -0.011 -0.013
(0.007) (0.008) (0.013)
Pulp-paper sector -1.576*** - - -1.280* -1.992***
(0.524) (0.697) (0.764)
Waste incineration 0.353 - - -0.008 0.791
(0.400) (0.383) (0.822)
Other sectors -2.139*** - - -2.805*** -2.139**
(0.621) (0.993) (0.901)
Observations 3797 1461 2336 2124 1673
No. of subjects 448 191 257 264 184
No. of failures 89 44 45 50 39
Log likelihood -445.08 -190.42 -203.21 -209.29 -161.32
Chi-squared 67.59 7.30 30.29 106.50 68.33
P-value 0.00 0.61 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: This table shows the coefficients of the Cox proportional hazard model from five sub-samples for the period 1992-
2009. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the boiler has flue gas condensation technology in-
stalled; zero otherwise. Continuous variables are in units of 10. (1) General model for the pooled sample with sector
dummies. The variable ”Other sectors” is a dummy variable for boilers in the wood, metal, food, and chemical industries,
while the reference group is heat & power sector. (2) Estimates for heat and power sector, (3) estimates for other sectors, (4)
estimates for counties with stringent emission intensity standards, and (5) estimates for counties with lax emission inten-
sity standards. Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary correlation within firm-level
clusters. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 5: Adoption of technologies. Parametric estimations using Weibull
distribution.
Variable Post- Combustion Flue gas
combustion condensation
Net NOx charge levelt 1 0.321** -0.005 -0.375
(0.139) (0.152) (0.331)
Post-comb. tech.t 1 - -0.212 0.469
(0.252) (0.288)
Combustion tech.t 1 0.005 - 0.235
(0.273) (0.246)
Flue gas cond. tech.t 1 0.363 0.348* -
(0.360) (0.204)
Capacity 0.025*** -0.005 -0.047
(0.008) (0.013) (0.031)
Entrant 1996-1997 -0.664* -0.169 -1.092***
(0.390) (0.210) (0.365)
Entrant 1998-2009 0.293 0.436* -0.523
(0.342) (0.258) (0.404)
Bio/fossil fuel costt+1 -0.009 -0.012 0.163**
(0.087) (0.050) (0.072)
Plant post-comb.t 1 0.294 - -
(0.237)
Firm post-comb.t 1 -0.057 - -
(0.044)
Sector post-comb.t 1 -0.058* - -
(0.030)
Plant comb.t 1 - 0.114 -
(0.152)
Firm comb.t 1 - 0.022 -
(0.016)
Sector comb.t 1 - -0.021*** -
(0.008)
Plant flue gas.t 1 - - -0.328
(0.247)
Firm flue gas.t 1 - - 0.044*
(0.025)
Sector flue gas.t 1 - - -0.047***
(0.010)
Observations 3680 3016 3797
No. of subjects 484 464 448
No. of failures 110 194 89
Log likelihood -230.98 -324.72 -170.07
Chi-squared 125.34 28.79 66.85
P-value 0.00 0.01 0.00
Weibull shape parameter 1.34 0.96 3.09
P value 0.45 0.87 0.00
Notes: This table shows the coefficients of the parametric proportional hazard model with Weibull
distribution for (1) post-combustion technologies, (2) combustion technologies, and (3) flue gas con-
densation technology for the pooled sample 1992-2009. The dependent variable is an indicator
variable equal to one if the boiler has one of the technologies installed described above and zero
otherwise. Continuous variables are in units of 10. Sector dummies are not shown to save space.
Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary correlation within
firm-level clusters. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 6: Adoption of technologies for boilers that entered theNOx charge
system since 1992.
Variable Post- Combustion Flue gas
combustion condensation
Net NOx charge levelt 1 0.576*** -0.064 -0.768*
(0.128) (0.225) (0.419)
Post-comb. tech.t 1 - 0.223 0.579**
(0.356) (0.263)
Combustion tech.t 1 0.047 - -0.104
(0.321) (0.287)
Flue gas cond. tech.t 1 -0.107 0.365 -
(0.469) (0.401)
Capacity 0.017*** -0.001 -0.065
(0.006) (0.013) (0.051)
Bio/fossil fuel costt+1 0.012 -0.129 0.130
(0.088) (0.097) (0.087)
Plant post-comb.t 1 0.816*** - -
(0.227)
Firm post-comb.t 1 -0.033 - -
(0.051)
Sector post-comb.t 1 0.022 - -
(0.014)
Plant comb.t 1 - 0.292 -
(0.232)
Firm comb.t 1 - 0.085* -
(0.051)
Sector comb.t 1 - -0.027*** -
(0.010)
Plant flue gas.t 1 - - -0.271
(0.703)
Firm flue gas.t 1 - - 0.065
(0.050)
Sector flue gas.t 1 - - 0.005
(0.007)
Observations 1066 1027 1437
No. of subjects 112 115 114
No. of failures 63 73 51
Log likelihood -267.18 -313.95 -222.12
Chi-squared 54.18 13.39 12.92
P-value 0.00 0.10 0.11
Notes: This table shows the coefficients of the Cox proportional hazard model for (1) post-
combustion technologies, (2) combustion technologies, and (3) flue gas condensation technology
for the sample of boilers that entered the NOx charge system in 1992 and continued operating un-
til 2009. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the boiler has one of the
technologies installed described above and zero otherwise. Continuous variables are in units of
10. Sector dummies are excluded due to few observations in some sectors. Standard errors, in
parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary correlation within firm-level clusters. *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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